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JAPAN’S 2011 DISASTER: RESPONSES TO NATURAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
CATASTROPHES
The triple disaster that hit the Tohoku region of Japan on 11 March 2011 
triggered a massive human displacement: more than 400,000 people 
evacuated their homes as a gigantic tsunami induced by a magnitude 9.0 
earthquake engulfed the coastal areas, and the following nuclear accident 
in Fukushima released a large amount of radioactive materials into the 
atmosphere. This study analyses the disaster response, with a particular 
focus on evacuation of the population, and social consequences of this 
complex crisis, based on intensive fieldwork carried out one year after the 
catastrophe. It reveals that the responses of the Japanese authorities and 
population were significantly different between a natural disaster and an 
industrial (man-made) accident.
TWO EVACUATION PATTERNS: RISK PERCEPTION VERSUS VULNERABILITY
Being prone to both earthquakes and tsunamis, Japan had been preparing 
itself against such risks for many years. A tsunami alert was immediately 
issued and the population knew how and where to evacuate. In contrast, 
the evacuation from the nuclear accident was organised in total chaos, as 
a severe accident or large-scale evacuation had never been envisaged—let 
alone exercised—before the disaster. The population was thus forced to 
flee with no information as to the gravity of the accident or radiation risk. 
In both cases, the risk perception prior to the catastrophe played a key role 
in determining the vulnerability of the population at the time of the crisis.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES FROM THE DISASTER: DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 
AND FAMILIES
While tsunami evacuees are struggling with a slow reconstruction 
process due to financial difficulties, nuclear evacuees are suffering from 
uncertainty as to their prospect of return. One year after the accident, 
the Japanese authorities began to encourage nuclear evacuees to return 
to the areas contaminated by radiation according to a newly established 
safety standard. This triggered a vivid controversy within the affected 
communities, creating a rift between those who trust the government’s 
notion of safety and those who do not. The nuclear disaster has thus 
become a major social disaster in Japan dividing and weakening the 
affected communities.ww
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The triple disaster that hit the Tohoku region 
of Japan on 11 March 2011 had a profound and 
transformative effect on Japanese society. Japan 
is globally known to be one of the countries best 
prepared for earthquakes and tsunamis, but the 
earthquake and tsunami that hit the country were 
far beyond the authorities’ expectations. Indeed, 
this disaster represents the greatest challenge that 
Japan has faced since the World War II defeat: 
for the first time, a natural disaster on a massive 
scale was compounded by one of the worst nuclear 
disasters in history. The disaster caused nearly 
16,000 deaths and displaced hundreds of thou-
sands of people from their homes. One year later, 
there are still 344,000 evacuees who cannot go 
back home either because they lost their houses 
in the earthquake and the tsunami, or because 
their houses were contaminated by radioactive 
substances released from the crippled Fukushima 
nuclear power station. 
The Disaster Evacuation and Risk Perception in 
Democracies (DEVAST) project is one of the first in-
ternational research projects designed to analyse 
the social and political consequences of this triple 
disaster. Its aim is to collect immediate, first-hand 
evidence from the field, which is at risk of disap-
pearing unless documented urgently. To achieve 
this goal, interviews were conducted in the affect-
ed areas from January to June 2012 with evacuees 
and other stakeholders such as public authorities 
and aid workers. This study presents the major 
findings from this fieldwork. It first analyses the 
disaster response with a special emphasis on the 
disaster evacuation. Risk perception among the 
affected communities is then examined in terms 
of how this perception, prior to the disaster, influ-
enced the actual disaster response and individual 
decisions to evacuate during the catastrophe, and 
how it evolved in the aftermath. Then, the paper 
attempts to identify the major post-disaster chal-
lenges that face the affected communities and 
evacuees and the social and political impacts in-
duced by the disaster that affect Japanese society 
as a whole. Ultimately, this research attempts to 
explore how a developed country with democratic 
institutions deals with disasters and draws lessons 
from this experience.
Two displacements
The field research found that the displacements 
caused by the tsunami and by the nuclear acci-
dent had many dissimilar aspects. In particular, 
the evacuation process, the prospects of return 
and the related social impacts differ significantly 
as the displacements were induced by different 
causes: one is a natural disaster, while the other is 
an industrial (man-made) disaster. 
Evacuation triggered by the tsunami 
The evacuation from the tsunami can be charac-
terised as an evacuation with warning, prepara-
tion and knowledge. Given its geological condi-
tions, Japan has developed an advanced system 
of disaster prevention and coping mechanisms 
against earthquakes and tsunamis over the years. 
The affected communities of Tohoku were particu-
larly aware of the risk, as the region had already 
undergone many tsunamis, and the lessons from 
such experiences had been passed down by 
the older generations. These communities had 
therefore prepared themselves by building high 
breakwaters along the coast and creating hazard 
maps on which expected flood zones were clearly 
marked out. Disaster drills were also regularly 
conducted. On the day of the disaster, as early 
as three minutes after the earthquake, a tsunami 
alert was issued advising the local population to 
evacuate. The disaster prevention system against 
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the tsunami was thus initiated correctly. Yet it was 
not without limitations in the face of an extreme 
disaster. Despite its promptness, the tsunami 
alert lacked gravity in light of the actual threat: 
this in fact reassured the population instead of 
sounding the alarm. Some residents who thought 
that the breakwater was high enough to stop the 
tsunami decided to stay on the second floor of 
their house rather than evacuate to higher ground. 
The research also found that the knowledge and 
previous experience of tsunamis among the popu-
lation did not always help save lives during the 
disaster. The tsunami anecdotes from the older 
generations embedded in the minds of the local 
population led people to expect that the maximum 
height of the tsunami would be six metres, and 
that the wave would arrive 10–15 minutes after the 
earthquake. Thus, many were taken by surprise 
when the tsunami actually arrived: it had a 
10–15 metre inundation height and arrived 30–40 
minutes after the earthquake. This created many 
victims among those who had underestimated the 
height of the tsunami, or assumed that the wave 
would not come once that 15 minutes had elapsed 
following the earthquake. 
It is commonly assumed that local knowledge 
and experience are a key factor in reducing the 
population’s vulnerability in the face of disas-
ters. Yet our research found otherwise: in the 
case of the Japanese disaster, previous experi-
ence proved to be the key factor in creating their 
vulnerability.
Consequences of the displacement due to 
the tsunami
One year after the disaster, the issue of resett-
lement for the tsunami evacuees is a key prio-
rity in the affected communities. Consultations 
between evacuees and local authorities have 
been organised regularly in order to come up 
with a resettlement plan that meets the expec-
tations of most evacuees and ensures their safety 
from another disaster. But this process has 
reached stalemate due to financial and adminis-
trative obstacles. The resettlement scheme has 
indeed been poorly coordinated and synchro-
nised among the different municipalities, crea-
ting disparities in the assistance provided to the 
evacuees. This has created resentment among the 
communities that received less financial assis-
tance, with the result that the evacuees refused 
the resettlement plan initially agreed with the 
local authorities. With the evacuee resettle-
ment plan at a standstill, the reconstruction of 
social and economic activities for the whole area 
has been put on hold or further delayed. Under 
these circumstances, young people, who are 
frustrated with the slow reconstruction process 
and the lack of job opportunities, have begun to 
leave for the big cities in order to rebuild their 
lives. Prior to the disaster, Tohoku was already a 
marginalised region with the chronic problems 
of a shrinking economy and an aging popula-
tion. The disaster will simply exacerbate these 
trends unless acted upon urgently. The affected 
communities are thus now facing the enormous 
challenge of accelerating the reconstruction 
process and at the same time ensuring that the 
communities are rebuilt in such a way that they 
will be sustainable both economically and demo-
graphically in the future. 
Evacuation triggered by the nuclear accident
By contrast with the evacuation triggered by the 
tsunami, the evacuation from the nuclear accident 
can be described as an evacuation without warning, 
preparation or knowledge. The research found that 
the affected municipalities were not officially 
informed about the evacuation order issued by the 
government at the time of the disaster and there-
fore had no choice but to improvise an evacua-
tion on their own. In addition, an evacuation on 
this scale had never been envisioned – let alone 
exercised – prior to the accident. As a result, the 
evacuation was organised in an ad hoc and chaotic 
manner, leaving the population in great confusion. 
From the field interviews, it became clear that the 
local population had indeed never prepared for 
such a serious accident, as the myth of absolute 
safety of nuclear installations had been nurtured 
over the years, leading people to believe that such 
an accident would never occur. Furthermore, no 
information on the gravity of the accident was 
communicated to the residents at the time of their 
displacement. Thus, the residents were forced to 
flee without any idea of how long their displace-
ment would last or how far they should go. Nor 
were evacuees informed about the risk of radia-
tion exposure or instructed on how to protect 
themselves against irradiation during their flight. 
The central government later admitted that it had 
had such information from the outset, but did not 
disclose it to the public in order to ‘avoid panic 
among the population’.
Consequences of the displacement due to 
the nuclear accident
The prospect of return for nuclear evacuees 
remains uncertain. One year after the accident, 
the question of return became a highly politi-
cised issue and the authorities have encouraged 
evacuees to return, while the evacuees them-
selves remain concerned about the radioactive 
contamination of their communities and the 
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effects of radiation on their health. In March 
2012, the government proposed a plan to reorga-
nise the evacuation zone according to radiation 
dose levels, thus creating an area recommended 
for early return. The field research found that this 
was done with very little consultation with the 
affected municipalities or evacuees, which thus 
caused a division among the displaced communi-
ties between those who wished to return and those 
who hesitated to do so. As the return is regarded 
as a symbol of community survival and resilience, 
those who are reluctant, often from fear of radia-
tion effects, are considered selfish and disloyal 
towards other community members. Similarly, 
the issue of evacuation is dividing communities 
affected by the radiation but located outside the 
evacuation zone in the Fukushima Prefecture. In 
these communities, the authorities are reassuring 
residents so that they will stay put, emphasising 
that it is safe to live in the area despite signifi-
cantly high radiation levels. In this context, those 
who voluntarily evacuated by their own means, 
so-called self-evacuees, are regarded as cowardly, 
selfish or disloyal towards the community to 
which they belong. The nuclear disaster is also 
a social disaster creating many tensions and divi-
sions in the affected communities, where those 
who choose not to follow the policy line set by the 
authorities are often marginalised. In addition, 
the information on radioactive contamination 
and health risks from radiation provided by the 
authorities is neither forthright nor comprehen-
sive, leaving the evacuees in great confusion and 
anxiety. Under these circumstances, evacuees 
continue to suffer from uncertainties about their 
immediate future and the affected communities 
are at risk of disintegration. Reconstruction is 
still a distant prospect for the nuclear evacuees.
Disasters and democracy
The 11 March disaster induced two patterns of displa-
cement that were highly dissimilar. The disaster 
response of the authorities in dealing with these 
evacuations also differed in many ways. Despite the 
fact that Japan is a developed nation with highly 
advanced technologies, many vulnerabilities have 
been revealed in the way the country has dealt 
with the chain of impacts triggered by the 11 March 
catastrophe. No evacuation or contingency plans 
had been prepared for a nuclear accident of such 
magnitude, while the tsunami was far beyond the 
authorities’ expectations. This leads us to question 
the common assumption that industrialised demo-
cracies are better prepared to deal with disasters.
In the aftermath of the disaster, a key question 
that arose was whether the disaster, particularly 
the nuclear accident, was intrinsically Japanese 
in nature, or whether it could have happened in 
other countries. Though elements of the Japanese 
culture and political system indeed played an im-
portant role, we believe that no country is immune 
to such disasters. Advanced democracies are not 
necessarily more resistant or better prepared than 
developing countries to deal with such events. 
The 11 March disaster shook the very foundation 
of Japanese society, shattering the idea of a safe 
and secure society guaranteed by the authorities. 
The Japanese public has started to question the 
level of risk that they were willing to accept and 
the model of society that they had aspired to prior 
to the disaster. Though Japan certainly has both 
the technical and financial capacities to rebuild the 
towns affected by the disaster, the social tensions 
and divisions created as a result will probably take 
much longer to heal. The Japanese experience thus 
offers many unique lessons for other democracies 
in terms of dealing with future disasters.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The DEVAST project was designed to analyse the 
disaster response, the population displacement, 
and the social consequences of the 2011 Japanese 
triple disaster. It is a joint research project between 
French and Japanese research teams financed by 
the ANR and the JST respectively. The French 
DEVAST team consists of five researchers in addi-
tion to two interns from IDDRI, Sciences Po. The 
Japanese team comprises three professors and 
four graduate students from TITech and Waseda 
University, as well as two post-doctoral fellows 
from the United Nations University (UNU). The 
project runs from October 2011 until March 2013. 
This study presents the major findings from the 
field research conducted in Japan as part of this 
project. The fieldwork was carried out by the ID-
DRI research team in close cooperation with the 
Japanese team from January to June 2012. The 
survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with 
evacuees, affected municipalities and other stake-
holders such as government officials and aid work-
ers. Secondary data were also collected during this 
period to complement the information gathered 
from the field interviews.
The paper is organised in six sections. Follow-
ing the introduction and methodology (Sections 1 
and 2), Section 3 analyses the disaster response to 
the tsunami, examining how the authorities and 
population reacted to the disaster and, in particu-
lar, how the evacuation was organised. This sec-
tion then shifts its focus to the affected commu-
nities’ perception of risk: the extent to which the 
risk perception prior to the disaster influenced the 
disaster preparedness as well as individual deci-
sions to evacuate during the crisis, and how this 
perception evolved after the event. The prospect 
of resettlement or return for the evacuees is also 
closely analysed to illustrate the challenges facing 
the affected communities one year after the disas-
ter. Finally, the section attempts to identify major 
social consequences induced by the disaster. Sec-
tion 4 examines the case of the Fukushima nuclear 
accident from the same angles of analysis. Lastly, 
Section 5 makes a comparative analysis of the char-
acteristics of both displacements. The conclusion 
in Section 6 provides a summary of these analyses 
and some lessons learnt from the Japanese disas-
ter in the nexus between disasters and democracy.
2. METHODOLOGY
The research involved collecting primary data 
(field interviews) and analysing secondary data 
(media reports, government documents, opinion 
surveys and scientific papers) available in three 
languages (Japanese, English and French).
Interview method
In order to collect the primary data, semi-struc-
tured interviews were conducted with evacuees 
and municipalities, while unstructured inter-
views were organised with government officials, 
aid workers from non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and other researchers. Three ques-
tionnaires, with 40 to 60 questions each, were 
prepared and used to interview different target 
groups: evacuees, self-evacuees1 and munici-
palities (see Appendices 1–3). The interviews 
were organised so that the interviewees could 
feel free to elaborate and express themselves on 
certain subjects, which enabled the interviewers 
1 During this study, ‘self-evacuees’ refer to those displaced 
due to the Fukushima nuclear accident, who decided to 
flee voluntarily for fear of radiation effects, as opposed 
to ‘evacuees’ who were displaced on the government’s 
order.
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to interact and ask the interviewees additional 
questions when required. Thus, the questionnaires 
were used more as a guiding tool for the inter-
viewers, with key questions being systematically 
asked while other questions were asked when time 
allowed. The interviews with government offi-
cials, NGOs and other researchers were conducted 
without questionnaires, which enabled the IDDRI 
research team to discuss in depth and exchange 
views on the research topic. As a result, the inter-
views carried out during this fieldwork were of 
a qualitative rather than quantitative nature. In 
order to supplement the quantitative aspect of 
our research, evacuee surveys conducted by other 
researchers (Imai and Tanba2) and public autho-
rities (NAIIC and Naraha Town3) were also drawn 
on and analysed in this study. 
One of the major difficulties in interviewing the 
displaced population is that it is difficult to ask 
what happened during the disaster as they are of-
ten deeply traumatised by the event: they had lost 
their family members, close friends or their homes. 
In view of the circumstances, the research team 
paid particular attention to creating an atmos-
phere that allowed a certain level of confidence to 
become established between the interviewer and 
interviewee, so that the interviewee felt at ease to 
tell his/her story. For this purpose, each interview 
was organised with an ample time frame, averag-
ing from two to three hours. This meant that only 
two interviews were held per day (with some ex-
ceptions): one in the morning and the other in 
the afternoon. In order to increase the number of 
interviewees and thus obtain more robust results, 
interviews were also conducted with more than 
one interviewee at a time. The group interview 
with more than five interviewees was organised 
2 Professor Akira Imai from Fukushima University con-
ducted a panel survey among the nuclear evacuees in 
which the same questions were asked to the same inter-
viewees over time, thus allowing an analysis of how their 
opinions evolved. The first survey was conducted three 
months after the accident in June 2011, while the second 
was six months later in September 2011 and the third 12 
months after in February 2012 (Imai, 2011a; 2011c; 2012). 
In the survey, 300–400 evacuees were interviewed 
either face-to-face or by telephone. Associate Professor 
Fuminori Tanba from Fukushima University conducted a 
survey among the nuclear evacuees from eight affected 
municipalities between September and October 2011 
(Tanba, 2011). A total of 13,576 evacuees responded to 
the questionnaires sent by post. 
3 NAIIC is the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission created by the National Diet 
of Japan in order to investigate the cause of the accident 
and make policy recommendations. It produced a final 
report in July 2012 (NAIIC, 2012). Naraha town com-
missioned Associate Professor Ryusuke Takaki of Iwaki 
Meisei University in Fukushima Prefecture to conduct a 
resident survey in February 2012 (Takaki, 2012). 
on two occasions. A group interview of ten tsu-
nami evacuees from Ofunato City was organised 
in April 2012 and a group of five nuclear evacuees 
from Futaba town was conducted in June. In to-
tal, 66 interviews were conducted during the field 
research, while the total number of interviewees 
reached 106. Thus, the average number of inter-
viewees for each interview was 1.6 persons.
Selection and profiles of interviewees
The IDDRI research team interviewed a total of 
106 persons, including 66 evacuees, 13 municipal 
officers, 11 aid workers, 7 residents and other non-
evacuees of the affected towns, 7 researchers/
academics and 2 government officials. Out of the 
total 106 interviewees, 49 persons were involved 
in the tsunami evacuation and 57 persons in the 
nuclear evacuation. Among the 66 evacuees inter-
viewed, 37 were displaced because of the tsunami 
(‘tsunami evacuees’) and 29 due to the nuclear 
accident (‘nuclear evacuees’). Among the 29 
nuclear evacuees, 4 persons are self-evacuees who 
decided to evacuate on their own initiative from 
fear of radiation effects, and the other 25 persons 
are evacuees from the official evacuation zones. 
Table 1 shows the total number of interviewees 
according to the different categories. It is impor-
tant to note that the name of towns and cities listed 
in the table are the places where the interviewees 
are originally from and do not always indicate 
the places where the interviews were held. For 
tsunami evacuees, the interviews were conducted 
in their towns of origin as they had often been 
displaced within their hometown. On the other 
hand, nuclear evacuees had been forced to leave 
their hometowns in order to avoid radiation effects 
and the interviews were thus conducted in their 
places of refuge, which were often scattered and 
far from their hometown. The names of cities and 
towns listed in Table 1 for nuclear evacuees and 
municipalities thus refer to the origin of the inter-
viewees and not the location of interviews. 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the age and gender dis-
tribution of the evacuees interviewed during the 
field research. Figure 2 shows that the majority of 
interviewees (67%) were female. This is mainly 
due to the fact that in the traditional communities 
of the Tohoku region women tend to be available 
during the day for interviews as they stay at home 
while their husbands go out to work. 
The research team used the following ways to 
find and select the evacuees for interviews. First, 
the team approached each municipal office and 
asked them to identify possible candidates for 
interviews. The evacuees they proposed were 
often the representatives of evacuee communi-
ties or the community service officers who were 
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Table 1. Number of persons interviewed
Interviewee Tsunami Nuclear Accident
Central government 0 2 1: Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI)
1:Reconstruction Agency
Local government (Municipalities) 4 2: Ishinomaki City
1: Ofunato City
1: Rikuzentakada City
9 
 
3: Naraha town
2: Minami-Soma City
2: Futaba town
2: Iwaki City
Evacuees 37 28: Ofunato City
4: Ishinomaki City
2: Rikuzentakata City
3: Iwaki City
29 11: Naraha town
7: Futaba town
2: Minami-Soma City
2: Iwaki City (Hisanohama District)
1: Namie town
1: Okuma town
1: Tomioka town
2: Fukushima City
2: Koriyama City
NGOs 4 1: Child Fund Japan 
1: Peace Winds Japan
1: Peace Boat1 
1: Platform Japan
7 3: AAR2
2: Fukushima CRMS3
1: Kodomo Fukushima4
1: ADRA5
Academics 3 1: Aoyama Gakuin
University 
(at the time)
1: California Institute 
for Technology
1: Kyoto University
4 3: Fukushima University
1: Tohoku University
Affected residents (and other 
non-evacuees)
1 1: Rikuzentakada City 6 4: Iwaki City
1: Gumma City
1: Fukushima City 
TOTAL 49 57
GRAND TOTAL 106
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evacuees themselves but temporarily employed by 
the municipality to assist evacuees living in tem-
porary shelters. Secondly, we asked NGOs assist-
ing evacuees in the field to introduce us to some 
of their beneficiaries or their local contacts. Lastly, 
the team met evacuees through the personal con-
tacts that the researchers had established prior to 
the project implementation. For example, a mem-
ber of the IDDRI research team had made many 
contacts when she worked as a volunteer in one of 
temporary shelters in Ofunato City. Many evacu-
ees in this shelter agreed to be interviewed and 
introduced us to other evacuees willing to be in-
terviewed. Finding evacuees through these three 
different channels enabled the team to gather 
diverse opinions on the questions asked and thus 
obtain a balanced and representative view of the 
evacuees.
Participation in meetings and seminars on 
voluntary evacuation
In addition to interviews, the IDDRI research team 
attended seminars and meetings organised by civil 
associations in order to collect more information 
and stories on the evacuation triggered by the 
nuclear disaster (the list of these seminars is atta-
ched in Appendix 4). The team attended a seminar 
in May 2012 in Tokyo organised by ‘Fukushima 
hinan boshi no kai in Kanto’ (the Association 
for Fukushima Evacuee Mothers & Children in 
Kanto4), during which a self-evacuee from Otama 
village, Fukushima Prefecture, presented her story 
of evacuation. Another workshop was organised 
in June 2012 by ‘3.11iko no kosodate wo kangaeru 
kai’ (the Association to Consider Child-Rearing 
since 3.11 in Tokyo5), where a self-evacuee from 
Koriyama City, Fukushima Prefecture, told her 
evacuation story and a member of the civil asso-
ciation, Kodomo Fukushima, presented the situa-
tion of radioactive contamination and the diffi-
culties that the residents face in Fukushima City. 
In addition to the seminars, a research member 
attended, as an observer, two meetings organised 
by a member of Kodomo Fukushima in Kyoto City, 
both of which were closed to the public. These 
were consultation meetings between a member 
of the Fukushima prefectural assembly and the 
evacuees from Fukushima Prefecture, during 
which the evacuees’ grievances were presented to 
the member of the prefectural assembly. In total, 
19 evacuees were present at the meetings, inclu-
ding 16 self-evacuees and 3 evacuees from the 
official evacuation zone. The stories collected at 
4 Author’s translation.
5 Author’s translation.
these meetings and workshops were extremely 
valuable for the field research with respect to 
understanding and analysing the phenomenon of 
voluntary evacuation, since it was very difficult for 
the research team to establish individual contacts 
with self-evacuees given that these people were 
dispersed throughout Japan and the municipali-
ties did not have much information about them. 
Selection of target cities/towns for 
interviews
Table 2 lists the target municipalities for inter-
views. The target cities for the tsunami evacuation 
were selected according to the scale of damage or 
the contacts that the research team had already 
established prior to the field research. Ishino-
maki City is the municipality that had the highest 
number of deaths due to the 11 March tsunami 
(3,4716), while Rikuzentakata City had one of the 
worst mortality rates compared to total population 
(7.63%7). Moreover, the Japanese DEVAST team 
had already visited Ishinomaki City before the 
arrival of the French team and already established 
contacts within the municipality, which facili-
tated our interviews. Ofunato City was selected 
due to the number of contacts that one of the 
IDDRI research team had already made through 
her previous volunteer activities. Iwaki City was 
chosen because it was affected both by the tsunami 
and the nuclear accident and is also the city that 
hosts a large number of evacuees from the evacua-
tion zone due to its proximity to the zone. 
As regards nuclear evacuation, the target mu-
nicipalities for interviews were selected on the ba-
sis of their relationship with the crippled nuclear 
power station, the accessibility to the evacuees’ 
place of refuge or the contacts that the research 
team had already established. Futaba town was 
selected because it is one of the two towns that 
host the crippled Fukushima Daiichi (No.1) nu-
clear power plant.8 In addition, most of the Futaba 
residents evacuated to Iwaki City, which has rela-
tively lower airborne radiation levels compared to 
other cities within Fukushima Prefecture and it 
was thus easier for the research team to visit this 
6 Source: Miyagi prefectural government (http://www.
pref.miyagi.jp/kikitaisaku/higasinihondaisinsai/
pdf/09071600.pdf) (in Japanese)
7 Source: Iwate prefectural government (http://www.
pref.iwate.jp/~bousai/taioujoukyou/201209051700
jintekihigai.pdf) (in Japanese); The Statistics Bureau 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communica-
tions (http://www.e-stat.go.jp/estat/html/NewL-
ist/000001039448/NewList-000001039448.html) (in 
Japanese)
8 The Fukushima Daiichi (No.1) nuclear power plant is 
located on the border between Futaba town and Okuma 
town.
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location. Moreover, the Futaba municipal office 
was relocated to Kazo City, Saitama Prefecture, 
which is very near to Tokyo and thus more easily 
accessible to the research team.9 Naraha town was 
chosen because it is one of the two towns that host 
the Fukushima Daini (No.2) nuclear power plant,10 
which is situated 10 km south of No.1 station. The 
Naraha municipal office and most of its residents 
evacuated to Iwaki City, which facilitated our visit. 
Minami-Soma City was selected because of its par-
ticular situation as a nuclear community, as well 
as due to the contacts that had already been es-
tablished by the Japanese DEVAST team. Minami-
Soma City is located at 20–30 km north of No.1 
station. Only one part of the city was included in 
the official evacuation zone. As a result, the mu-
nicipal office stayed in the city while most of its 
residents evacuated either voluntarily or following 
evacuation orders. One year after the disaster, the 
city was trying to facilitate the return of its resi-
dents despite the high airborne radiation levels. 
The fourth target city, Iwaki City, is situated 30–
40 km south of No.1 station. One part of the city 
was declared by the government as a zone for shel-
ter indoors. This caused many residents from the 
other parts of the city to flee for fear of radiation 
effects despite reassurance from the city authori-
ties and the government. The city was selected for 
the research due to its relatively low radioactive 
contamination compared to other cities in Fuku-
shima, thus making it easier for the researchers to 
visit. In addition, it is the city that hosts the high-
est number of evacuees from the evacuation zone 
(23,00011) and tensions have arisen between the 
residents and the evacuees. In summary, the target 
cities include two towns hosting the nuclear power 
plants (one of which hosts the crippled nuclear 
power plant) and two others without the plants 
but heavily affected.
9 In general, the affected population evacuated to the 
place of relocation chosen by their municipalities. But 
there were also many who chose the place of refuge 
independently. As a result, evacuees are not necessarily 
living in the town where the municipalities set up their 
temporary offices. 
10 The Fukushima Daini (No.2) nuclear power plant is 
located on the border between Tomioka town and 
Naraha town.
11 Source: Iwaki City Council (http://www.city.iwaki.
fukushima.jp/info/dbps_data/_material_/info/zhi-
gai20120912.pdf) (in Japanese)
Table 2. Target municipalities for interviews
Tsunami Nuclear
Municipality Ishinomaki City
Rikuzentakada City
Oofunato City
Iwaki City
Futaba town
Naraha town
Minamisoma City
Iwaki City
Interviews for the tsunami disaster
In addition to the affected municipalities and 
evacuees, the research team conducted interviews 
with NGO workers, researchers/academics, and 
residents (non-evacuees) of the affected towns in 
order to collect more objective analyses and facts 
from third parties. Four NGOs were contacted: 
Peace Winds Japan, Child Fund Japan, Peace Boat 
Disaster Relief Volunteers Centre (PBV), and Plat-
form Japan, all of which provide assistance to the 
municipalities and evacuees affected by the earth-
quake and the tsunami. Three professors were also 
interviewed for an exchange of views: Professor 
Toshiya Tsukamoto in Aoyama Gakuin University 
(at the time), Professor Haruo Hayashi in Kyoto 
University, and Emeritus Professor Hiroo Kana-
mori of California Institute of Technology. One 
resident of Rikuzentakada City who was not an 
evacuee but part of the volunteer fire brigade for 
search and rescue operations was also interviewed 
to gather complementary information on what 
happened at the time of the disaster.
Interviews for the nuclear disaster
In addition to the affected municipalities and 
evacuees, two government officials were inter-
viewed: one from the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) and the other from the 
Reconstruction Agency.12 As for NGOs, four orga-
nisations were contacted: the Fukushima Network 
of Parents to Protect Children from Radiation 
(Kodomo Fukushima) and the Citizens’ Radioac-
tivity Measuring Station (CRMS), both based in 
Fukushima City, and the Association for Aid and 
Relief (AAR) and the Adventist Development and 
Relief Agency (ADRA) based in Tokyo. The first 
two NGOs are local associations created by the 
Fukushima residents after the disaster while the 
latter two are international NGOs that usually 
provide assistance abroad. Four professors who 
have conducted research on nuclear evacuation 
were also interviewed: Professor Akira Imai, Asso-
ciate Professor Fuminori Tanba and Associate 
Professor Hazuki Ishida from Fukushima Univer-
sity and Associate Professor Yuzuru Isoda from 
Tohoku University. 
12 This agency was established in December 2011 by the 
Prime Minister and is charge of reconstruction pro-
grammes for the affected Tohoku region.
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Map 1. The Tohoku region and three heavily affected prefectures
Map 2. Map of Fukushima Prefecture
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3. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN 
EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI
3.1. Overview of the event
On 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake 
struck off the Pacific coast of Tohoku in north-
eastern Honshu, the main island of Japan. The 
tremor triggered a tsunami that had a mean inun-
dation height of 10–15 m and a run-up height of 
40 m in some places (Mori and Takahashi, 2012: 
pp.1 and 13). According to the National Police 
Agency, 15,871 people lost their lives, with 2,778 
people missing (feared dead) and 6,114 people 
injured, as on 10 October 2012.13 Nearly 400,000 
houses were either severely damaged or comple-
tely destroyed. The Cabinet Office estimates 
the direct financial damage from the disaster at 
approximately 16.7 trillion yen (€167 billion).14 It 
was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded 
in Japan,15 and one of the world’s biggest earth-
quakes after the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake 
(M 9.1–9.3). The then Japanese Prime Minister, 
Naoto Kan, described the disaster as the worst 
crisis that Japan has had to face since the Second 
World War.
According to the official figure, the disaster dis-
placed a total of 386,739 people, recorded at one 
week after the disaster.16 In March 2012, one year 
on from the disaster, the number was still as high 
as 344,290,17 which indicates that most of the evac-
uees had not yet returned to their home or reset-
tled in permanent shelters. Half of these evacuees 
originate from the Fukushima Prefecture and most 
were displaced following the nuclear accident. 
The number of evacuees who left on account of 
the earthquake and tsunami alone can thus be es-
timated at around 170,000 people.
These evacuees are currently accommodated 
in three types of temporary shelters: prefabricat-
ed houses, private apartments and public-sector 
apartments. As early as April 2011, one month af-
ter the disaster, prefabricated houses were erected 
13 Source: National Police Agency (http://www.npa.
go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf). (in Japa-
nese)
14 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.bousai.go.jp/oshi-
rase/h23/110624-1kisya.pdf). (in Japanese)
15 Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). (http://
www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake/2011_Earth-
quake.html). (in Japanese)
16 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-
hisaisha/pdf/5-hikaku.pdf). (in Japanese)
17 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-
struction.go.jp/ topics/ 120413hinansya.pdf). (in Japa-
nese)
to house the displaced population. By May 2012, 
a total of 52,858 prefabricated houses had been 
constructed for the disaster evacuees, of which 
48,884 units are currently occupied.18 There were 
68,317 families living in private apartments, with 
rent covered by the government. Public-sector 
apartments, which were initially built to provide 
housing for public servants, were also utilised as 
evacuee accommodation. There were 19,041 of 
such apartments occupied by the evacuees. 
3.2. Disaster response 
and evacuation
This sub-section presents the major findings from 
the field interviews on the disaster response and 
evacuation process induced by the earthquake and 
tsunami. 
Evacuation with a tsunami warning that 
underestimated the gravity of the situation
Japan is a country prone to earthquakes and 
tsunamis due to its geological conditions. Over 
the years, it has thus developed an adaptation and 
disaster prevention mechanism using advanced 
technologies. The coastal communities of Tohoku 
in particular had prepared themselves for the 
eventuality of a disaster, as they have already 
experienced many tsunamis. When the earth-
quake hit the Tohoku region on 11 March 2011, the 
tsunami warning was issued by the Japan Meteo-
rological Agency (JMA) only three minutes after 
the earthquake, and immediately disseminated 
to the municipalities likely to be impacted (JMA 
2011b: p.3). The warning was then transmitted 
through loudspeakers installed in these coastal 
towns for the purpose of public broadcasting. The 
disaster prevention mechanism was thus acti-
vated as planned. However, the field interviews 
revealed that the system had many shortcomings. 
First, the estimated tsunami height announced in 
the warning was considerably different from the 
actual tsunami height. The JMA issued a warning 
of a 6 m tsunami for Miyagi Prefecture and no 
more than a 3 m tsunami for Iwate and Fukushima 
Prefectures (JMA 2011a: p.3). On hearing this 
alert, some residents decided to stay on the second 
floor of their house instead of evacuating to higher 
ground. In addition, the fact that these coastal 
towns had 5–10 m breakwaters built along the 
coast for protection against the inflow of tsunami 
waves further delayed the residents’ decision to 
flee. One evacuee from Ofunato City said: 
18 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-
struction.go.jp/topics/120521genjototorikumi.pdf). (in 
Japanese)
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When I first heard a tsunami warning for 3 
metres, I thought that it would be all right be-
cause the breakwater in our town is higher than 
that.
The survey conducted by the JMA in June 2011 
on the post-disaster evacuation following the 
tsunami alert also collected the similar testimo-
nies from tsunami survivors (JMA, 2011a: p.5). 
During our interviews, a couple of evacuees also 
mentioned that those who had already evacu-
ated to higher ground even went back home after 
hearing the expected height of tsunami, thinking 
that they would survive in their house. Further-
more, citizen volunteers from the Community 
Fire Brigade19 went to the coastal area to close the 
breakwater gates, a task allocated to them by the 
contingency planning, expecting the breakwater 
to be high enough to stop the tsunami. Many of 
them lost their lives as the tsunami engulfed the 
breakwaters. In reality, the tsunami that hit the 
three prefectures had a 10–15 m mean inundation 
height and a 40 m run-up height in some places. It 
was only after the arrival of the tsunami that the 
JMA amended the height to ‘more than 10 m’ for 
all three prefectures. As a result, despite the early 
tsunami warning, many residents were caught by 
surprise when the actual tsunami arrived.
Later, it was also discovered that the govern-
ment possessed GPS-controlled tide gauge equip-
ment, installed off the coast of Tohoku by the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism (MLIT), which had accurately predicted 
the height of the tsunami prior to its arrival on the 
coast. According to the presentation made by the 
Member of Parliament, Itsunori Onodera, at the 
House of Representatives on 2 February 2012, the 
information from the GPS gauge was transmitted 
to the JMA before the tsunami arrived, but the 
JMA did not take this into account until after the 
event as it was neither part of their procedure nor 
integrated into their method of calculating the tsu-
nami height.20 
The second shortcoming of the tsunami warning 
was the way in which the warning was disseminat-
ed. The alert is usually transmitted by the relevant 
municipal offices via loudspeakers installed all 
19 This is a voluntary fire corps formed by the residents of 
each community/district in towns and cities. It partici-
pates in and helps the activities of fire fighters on a com-
munity level in case of fire and disasters.
20 The testimony of Itsunori Onodera (Liberal Demo-
cratic Party) at the House of Representatives during the 
Budget Committee of the House of Representatives on 
2 February 2012 can be viewed on the following site: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efGa86LURHg (in 
Japanese).
over town. The interviews with evacuees and local 
authorities found that many of these loudspeak-
ers did not function either because the earthquake 
had knocked down the speaker poles or because 
transmission had been disrupted by the power cut 
following the earthquake. According to the survey 
conducted by the JMA after the disaster, 17 out of 
27 affected municipalities responded that their tsu-
nami alert transmission system had broken down 
and did not function properly at the time of the 
disaster (Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 
2011: p.7). This indicates that the installed system 
was simply not well adapted to the magnitude of 
the disaster and thus not reliable during the actual 
crises. 
Thirdly, according to the interviewed survivors, 
even when the public speakers were functioning, 
the warning message issued by the municipal 
office was given in such a polite and calm tone 
(‘Please evacuate’) that the residents did not fully 
appreciate its gravity. The field research found 
that only 3 out of 28 interviewed evacuees had 
been prompted to flee on account of the tsunami 
warning transmitted by the local authority over 
the loudspeakers. The majority of residents fled 
after actually witnessing the tsunami, on the ba-
sis of their own judgement or previous experience, 
listening to the radio broadcasts, or being directly 
warned by the community fire brigade on patrol. 
In summary, the tsunami warning during the 
11 March disaster, although timely, suffered from 
failings with respect to an assessment of the grav-
ity of the tsunami, the transmission system used 
and an inadequate communication of the level of 
risk. 
Relief operations and a limited capacity 
to accept aid
In the field, local governments – both municipal 
and prefectural authorities – were the main coor-
dination bodies for relief operations. The inter-
views with municipal officers and aid workers 
from NGOs made it clear that the affected local 
authorities in the remote coastal region of Tohoku 
often lacked experience in working with civil orga-
nisations such as NGOs and citizen volunteers, 
and were simply overwhelmed by the number 
of offers. In Ishinomaki City, according to the 
Director of Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteers 
Centre (PBV), the offer of volunteers was initially 
turned down by the local authority on the grounds 
that the city had no coordination or reception 
arrangements in place for the volunteers. In addi-
tion, one municipal officer from the same city 
recalled during the interview that food aid was 
sometimes wasted when the person in charge of 
evacuation centres, often municipal officers, did 
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not know how to distribute it properly. According 
to him, when food aid of rice balls arrived in an 
evacuee camp, the camp manager realised that 
the number of rice balls was not enough to distri-
bute to everybody in the camp and thus decided to 
simply throw them in the garbage in order to avoid 
strife and chaos in the centre. In other instances, 
the municipal officials managing the distribution 
of relief items required the donating organisa-
tions and companies to provide ‘each survivor 
with items that were exactly the same in brand, 
type and size’ and, as a result, ‘many resources 
were wasted or used inefficiently’ during the relief 
operations (Yeoh, 2012: p.8). 
The Secretary General of the Association for Aid 
and Relief (ARR), which operates mainly in devel-
oping countries, also pointed out the cultural hesi-
tancy to accept aid, specific to Japanese society. 
The relief operation in Tohoku made him aware 
that, compared to beneficiaries in other countries, 
the Japanese population generally lack the capac-
ity to seek help and accept assistance. When help is 
offered, Japanese people tend to decline, either to 
preserve their dignity or out of concern not to in-
convenience others. Another aid worker from AAR 
recalled one scene: 
When I arrived at a house badly damaged by 
the tsunami, there was a woman still living in-
side the house without any electricity, water or 
food. There was no heating stove either. When I 
asked her what I could bring to help her, she said 
‘No, don’t worry about me. There are people who 
are in greater need than I am’.
In Japan, an industrialised country with a func-
tioning social welfare system, the local authori-
ties were simply not used to receiving help and 
thus quickly became overwhelmed by all the of-
fers of assistance that came in from all over Japan 
and abroad. Thus, the field interviews found that 
the population’s cultural hesitancy to receive as-
sistance compounded the difficulties that volun-
teers, NGOs and other private donors encountered 
in delivering aid to the needy during the relief 
operations.
3.3. Perception of risk
The affected region of Tohoku had long been aware 
of the tsunami risk and was thus highly prepared 
for the eventuality prior to the disaster. This sub-
section attempts to analyse how this perception 
influenced individual decisions to flee and disaster 
mitigation during the actual crises. 
High perception of tsunami risks
Prior to the 11 March disaster, the affected 
coastal cities had already been expecting a major 
earthquake (M 7.4) to occur with a 99% prob-
ability within the next thirty years, and the To-
hoku region had thus prepared intensively against 
such risk (Mori and Takahashi, 2012: p.2). In the 
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estimation, the tsunami was predicted to have a 
10.2 m run-up height in Rikuzentakada City and 
7.3 m in Naraha town.21 On the basis of these esti-
mates, the municipalities had created hazard maps 
to mark out the zone at risk of flooding in the re-
spective cities (Map 3). Based on the hazard maps, 
evacuation drills were organised regularly. All of 
the evacuees interviewed mentioned that they had 
been informed of such risk prior to the disaster. In 
addition, most of them were familiar with tsunami 
disasters and knew what to do in such an event, 
having learnt from previous experiences and sto-
ries told by the elderly. 
The shortcomings of hazard maps
The field survey found that the hazard maps desi-
gned to prepare the residents against tsunamis did 
not always help to save lives in the actual disaster. 
According to the local government employee of 
Rikuzentakada City that we interviewed, the map 
had indeed helped to raise the awareness of those 
residents living in the predicted inundation zone 
and prepare them for an eventual tsunami. On 
the other hand, it also created a feeling of reas-
surance for those who lived outside the predicted 
inundation zone, giving them the impression that 
they were safe from the tsunami risk. Another map 
shown by the same official during the interview 
indicated the location of houses whose residents 
lost their lives, and clearly shows the causal rela-
tionship between the hazard map and the survival 
of individuals. On the map,22 it was evident that 
victims resided just outside the predicted inun-
dation zone indicated on the hazard map – those 
residents who were not included in the tsunami 
drills. This suggests that the perception of risk and 
the disaster preparedness did, in the vast majority 
of cases, influence the survival of individuals at 
the time of disaster. 
Location of emergency evacuation points
All four evacuees interviewed in Ishinomaki City 
referred to the disaster as ‘man-made’, critici-
sing the local authority for insufficient prepare-
dness against a tsunami risk. In Ishinomaki City, 
which had the highest death toll (3,47123) of all the 
affected towns, survivors accuse the shortcomings 
of the municipality’s disaster preparation as a main 
21 Information provided by Rikuzentakada City and 
Naraha town councils during the interview.
22 The map was shown to us by the official of Rikuzen-
takada City during the interview but he declined to pro-
vide us with a copy of such a sensitive document out of 
respect for the victims’ families. 
23 Source: Miyagi Prefectural Government (http://www.
pref.miyagi.jp/kikitaisaku/higasinihondaisinsai/
pdf/09071600.pdf) (in Japanese).
cause of this high fatality rate. One of their accusa-
tions targets the location of emergency evacuation 
points. These points were generally designated at 
schools and public buildings but also at public car 
parks or a flat field. Originally intended as gathe-
ring points in case of fires or earthquakes, some of 
them were situated on lower ground close to the 
shoreline or on river banks. When the earthquake 
hit on 11 March 2011, many inhabitants gathered 
at these emergency points instead of taking refuge 
on higher ground, quite simply because these 
places were regularly used during disaster drills 
as the first assembly points. As a result, some of 
these residents lost their lives as the locations were 
completely inundated by the tsunami. One of the 
most tragic examples is the case of Okawa primary 
school in Ishinomaki City. Teachers decided to 
take the children to the emergency evacuation 
point located on the river bank instead of climbing 
the hill just next to the school, because it was the 
evacuation point designated in the contingency 
manual. As a result of this decision, 70% of the 
school children and teachers lost their lives when 
the tsunami travelled up the river.24 
These instances indicate that the evacuation 
points were not necessarily adapted to tsunami 
disasters and that the residents were not adequate-
ly informed or trained for tsunami evacuations in 
Ishinomaki City. This lesson needs to be properly 
addressed in future disaster planning.
Vulnerability created by previous tsunami 
experiences 
During the interviews, municipal officials and 
evacuees mentioned that having previous tsunami 
experiences had sometimes adversely affected 
individuals’ decision to flee and hence their 
survival during the 11 March tsunami. It is often 
assumed that people with previous disaster expe-
rience respond more effectively to a subsequent 
disaster and that the lessons learnt from past 
experience help them to avoid similar mistakes 
in the future. As Alexandre Magnan argues in the 
context of adaptive capacity to climate change, in 
societies regularly exposed to natural hazards, the 
experience of risk may confer a certain ability to 
respond to a changing climate and to integrate its 
effects (Magnan, 2010: p.8). Yet in the case of the 
11 March disaster, although experience did help to 
24 The newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun, ‘3.11 shogen: jidou, 
nakisakebi outo, gakkou saita no giseisya’ (Author’s 
translation: Testimony of 3.11: screaming and vomiting 
pupils, the worst death toll for schools), 19 April 2011; 
the newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, ‘hinan yori giron data 
40 fun, giseisyatasuu no ookawasyou’ (Author’s transla-
tion: 40 minutes of discussion instead of evacuation pro-
duced many victims), 13 June 2011.
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save lives of many, it also created a feeling of reas-
surance with respect to risk and thus made some 
of the population more vulnerable. The popula-
tion in these coastal cities had their perception of 
the tsunami risk shaped mainly by the experiences 
of the 1960 Chile Earthquake (M 9.5), which 
produced a 6 m-high tsunami that took 142 lives, 
and the 2010 Chile Earthquake (M 8.8), which 
occurred almost one year before the 11 March 
disaster and induced a 1 m-high tsunami affecting 
the region. The field interviews found that these 
recent experiences had given the inhabitants a 
rather fixed idea that the biggest tsunami likely 
to hit their cities would be around 6 metres high. 
Moreover, in the past, all of the tsunami warnings 
issued by the JMA and transmitted via the munici-
palities had always predicted much higher waves 
that those that actually occurred, thus creating 
a misperception that an actual tsunami would 
always be much smaller than the one predicted 
by official warnings. Given such convictions, the 
population underestimated the height and gravity 
of the tsunami that hit on 11 March 2011. Several 
evacuees also asserted that the experience of the 
foreshock (M 7.3) that struck on 9 March 2011, 
two days before the 3.11 also led the population 
to underestimate the tsunami risk of 11 March. At 
the time of the foreshock, a tsunami warning was 
announced but the tsunami that actually arrived 
was only 0.5 m high. 
Another fixed idea based on previous experi-
ences involves the time lag between the occur-
rence of an earthquake and the arrival of the ensu-
ing tsunami. According to the interviews, the past 
tsunami experiences of the local population had 
given them the idea that a tsunami would arrive 
10–15 minutes after an earthquake. During the 11 
March disaster, the tsunami reached the shoreline 
30–40 minutes after the earthquake in the towns 
(JMA, 2011b: p.10), contrary to the population’s 
expectations. As a result, many of those who had 
evacuated to higher ground immediately after the 
earthquake decided to return home once the fif-
teen minutes had elapsed, convinced that no tsu-
nami would follow on from the earthquake, and 
were hit by the enormous tsunami that arrived 
thirty minutes later.
From these instances, we discovered that the 
lessons learnt from previous experiences had para-
doxically sometimes been a contributing factor to 
the population’s underestimation of the risk or its 
misinterpretation of the danger signs during the 11 
March disaster, and that their experience had not 
always helped to mitigate the impacts. The inter-
views with tsunami survivors led us to the follow-
ing factual conclusion: while risk perception based 
on former experience did indeed help to save lives 
of many, in the face of an extreme disaster that ex-
ceeded all assumptions in terms of its magnitude, 
it also produced the reverse effect by creating false 
assumptions as to the level of risk.
3.4. Prospects of resettlement
From the interviews, we learnt that most of the 
evacuees wish to resettle on new land located 
on higher ground either because they no longer 
feel safe living in the place where their houses 
had been swept away or because it is not emotio-
nally possible to return as they are deeply trau-
matised by the loss of family members. One year 
after the disaster, the resettlement process began 
but evacuees were encountering many adminis-
trative and financial obstacles. The resettlement 
Figure 3. Photos of temporary shelters (prefabricated 
housing)
Photo (top): A prefabricated housing unit in Ofunato City, Iwate 
Prefecture, for tsunami evacuees. Taken by R. Hasegawa on 22 
March 2012. Photo (bottom): A prefabricated housing unit in 
Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture, for nuclear evacuees. Taken by 
R. Hasegawa on 5 April 2012.
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plan proposed by the government has three main 
components. First, the local authority purchases 
the land owned by each evacuee affected by the 
tsunami. With the money from this sale, evacuees 
are expected to purchase new land for resettle-
ment. Although the cost of house construction is 
not covered by the scheme, evacuees are entitled 
to receive financial assistance of up to around 
€30,000 as well as a special low-interest housing 
loan set up by the government worth up to 
€146,000 in order to rebuild their houses.25 
The field research found that evacuees were 
finding it very hard to resettle despite the various 
forms of government assistance. First, there is a 
problem of ‘double loans’. Some evacuees contin-
ue to pay for the mortgage of a house swept away 
by the tsunami. For these evacuees, it is extremely 
difficult to commit to another housing loan, even if 
it is part of the government scheme. Furthermore, 
many of them are still unemployed as their offices 
and factories were destroyed by the tsunami and 
have not yet been reconstructed. Secondly, pur-
chasing the new land for resettlement is difficult 
simply because land located on higher ground is 
scarce in some cities or because landowners are 
sometimes unwilling to sell land that has been in 
the family for generations. In other instances, the 
land is sometimes protected as a natural reserve 
and cannot be purchased, or landowners cannot 
be found as they are either dead or living abroad. 
Another obstacle stems from one of the condi-
tions laid down by the government resettlement 
scheme: at least five evacuee families must join 
together and decide collectively to resettle in the 
same place in order to benefit from the scheme. 
This condition was initially aimed at maintaining 
community ties, but it is instead creating many 
problems on the ground as the population is now 
scattered around different parts of the town or 
sometimes outside the town. This means that it is 
extremely difficult for the evacuees to get in touch 
with friends and former neighbours who would 
agree to resettle together. 
Lastly, the field interviews found that the man-
agement of resettlement schemes was very poorly 
synchronised by the local authorities. Many mu-
nicipal governments lost patience with what they 
considered to be a slow or inadequate process and 
began their own assistance schemes to comple-
ment the government scheme. The problem is that 
they started these without consulting neighbour-
ing towns, which has sparked off jealousy among 
the different communities and made it difficult to 
reach a consensus within the evacuee community. 
25 Source: Cabinet Office.
For example, Ishinomaki and Rikuzentakada Cit-
ies have proposed to purchase the tsunami-affect-
ed land for 70–80% of its original value, while 
Higashi-Matsuyama City (just next to Sendai City) 
has offered the evacuees up to 80–97% of the land 
value.26 As a result, evacuees in some localities 
began to renegotiate the terms of resettlement 
schemes with the municipal administration, thus 
causing further delay in the whole resettlement 
process. 
In this context, the resettlement process for 
evacuees is not advancing at a full speed. The situ-
ation is exerting an additional psychological strain 
on the evacuees, who have already suffered from 
the loss of close relatives or friends and now find 
themselves in the plight of displaced persons in 
camps and temporary shelters. 
3.5. Post-disaster challenges
The following points are developed to illustrate the 
situation and challenges facing tsunami evacuees 
and the affected communities one year after the 
disaster.
Reinventing the affected communities – 
‘building back better’
Prior to the disaster, Tohoku was already a margi-
nalised region facing the challenge of an aging 
population and the migration of its youth to 
larger cities in search of better job opportunities. 
In 2010, 26.3% of the population in Tohoku was 
over 65 years old, 3.3% higher than the national 
average (and compared to 16.8% in France).27 The 
economy of Tohoku was mainly based on agricul-
ture and fisheries, with the average wage standing 
17% lower than the national average.28 This trend 
is likely to accelerate in the wake of the disaster. 
One year after, reconstruction operations were 
intensified in the affected towns. The govern-
ment budget for reconstruction amounts to €150 
billion for the year 2011 and €37 billion for 2012.29 
Yet, so far, the authorities’ reconstruction efforts 
have seemed to focus more on rebuilding the 
physical infrastructures – the traditional notion of 
26 Source: Japan Institute of Construction Engineering 
(JICE) (http://www.jice.or.jp/sinsai/sinsai_result.
php?q=%93y%92n%94%83%82%A2%8E%E6%82%E
8&t=2). (in Japanese)
27 Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communica-
tions (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2010/
kihon1/pdf/gaiyou1.pdf) (in Japanese).
28 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/
sna/data/data_list/kenmin/files/contents/pdf/gai-
you2_1.pdf) (in Japanese).
29 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-
struction.go.jp/).
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reconstruction – and less on smaller but innovative 
social and economic projects to revitalise the com-
munities.30 During the interviews, several evacu-
ees expressed concern that many young people 
were leaving the town due to the lack of job op-
portunities after the disaster. According to them, 
the reconstruction works created many temporary 
job opportunities but these were confined to the 
construction sector and contracts were on a short-
term basis. Unable to find stable employment, 
many young people, especially those with qualifi-
cations, began to leave the town for big cities. Ac-
cording to a survey of 1,033 evacuees in Iwate, Mi-
yagi and Fukushima Prefectures conducted by the 
newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, between January and 
March 2012, 40% of them were still unemployed 
either because they had lost their jobs or their em-
ployers had suspended activity following the dis-
aster.31 The results of the same survey showed that 
the affected cities, including Ishinomaki City, had 
on average lost 6% of their population between 
2011 and 2012 (excluding the number of dead and 
missing due to the disaster) and, in the case of Ri-
kuzentakada City, the figure was 13.8%.32
Under these circumstances, rebuilding the af-
fected communities as they were before the dis-
aster seems not only inefficient but also unsus-
tainable both demographically and economically. 
The affected municipalities are thus dealing with 
the enormous challenge of implementing a well-
thought-out reconstruction plan to ensure a rapid 
recovery from the disaster, whilst at the same time 
dealing with the chronic problem of a shrinking 
economy and aging population. 
The elderly and persons with reduced 
mobility were the hardest hit 
The tsunami claimed many lives among the elderly 
and persons with reduced mobility living at home 
or in specialised facilities. During one interview, an 
Iwaki City employee explained that, for those who 
were living with their families, it was expected that 
the family members would help them to evacuate. 
But as the earthquake hit during the day, these 
members were either at work or at school and were 
unable to return home in time to rescue them. 
The elderly and persons with reduced mobility 
living alone at home were allocated to designated 
neighbours to assist them in case of disaster. But, 
likewise, these designated helpers were at work 
30 The Japan Times, ‘Reconstructing Tohoku to fit today’, 2 
April 2012.
31 Asahi Shimbun, ‘Jinko-gen keieishano-urei’ (Author’s 
translation: Falling population, business owners’ grief), 
11 March 2012.
32 Asahi Shimbun, Ibid.
and could not assist those who needed help to 
evacuate. As a result, many lost their life as they 
were unable to move from the house. According 
to the 2011 White Paper on Disaster Prevention 
edited by the Cabinet Office, 64.4% of fatalities 
from the 11 March disaster were over 60 years old, 
whereas the proportion of the population over 60 
in the region was 31%. The mortality rate for those 
in their seventies rose as high as 23.7%, and 21.8% 
for those in their eighties. 
As for persons with reduced mobility, it was re-
ported that their fatality rate was 2.5 times higher 
than that for all the affected populations.33 Accord-
ing to a survey conducted by a network of associa-
tions for disabled persons, Japan Disability Forum 
Miyagi, the average fatality rate among 13 affect-
ed municipalities in Miyagi Prefecture was 1.4% 
while the rate for the persons with disabilities was 
as high as 3.5% and 3.9% for those with physical 
disabilities.
These statistics show that the disaster preven-
tion measures were flawed when it came to ad-
dressing the needs of vulnerable groups in case of 
disaster, a lesson that should be taken into account 
for the future disaster preparations. 
Divided communities 
The field interviews with evacuees found that the 
disaster had caused tensions and divisions among 
the local population, which still persisted one year 
on. While stories of mutual help and solidarity 
were often emphasised by the evacuees, they also 
pointed up the different treatments and discrimi-
nations in the distribution of the aid received at 
the time of disaster. It emerged from the inter-
views that the evacuees categorise themselves into 
three groups: those who lost their houses and all 
their belongings in the tsunami; those who lost 
their houses but not their belongings due to the 
earthquake; and those whose houses were only 
partially destroyed. The third group of evacuees 
was considered ‘less affected’ compared to the first 
two groups and thus regarded as ‘less qualified’ 
to receive aid. As an evacuee from Rikuzentakada 
City explained:
When someone from a partially destroyed 
house came to an evacuation centre to get food 
and relief items, the evacuees in the centre open-
ly complained that the person did not have the 
right to receive assistance because her house was 
not completely destroyed. After such experiences, 
33 The newspaper, Nikkei Shimbun, ‘Higashinihon-
daishinsai no shougaisyasibouritsu, zentaino 25 bai. 
Nigeokureta kanousei’ (Author’s translation: The fatal-
ity rate from the Great East Japan disaster is 2.5 times 
higher among the disabled population: a possibility that 
they were unable to evacuate in time)’, 30 July 2012.
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those who were living in partially destroyed 
houses with no electricity, water or food often 
had to survive by their own means, hesitating to 
seek help. 
In addition, disparities also appeared depending 
on the evacuation centres. Large evacuation cen-
tres that attracted media attention received many 
offers of assistance from all over Japan, while small 
centres were most often ignored. These experi-
ences have created jealousy and mistrust among 
neighbours and friends, leaving deep scars in rela-
tionships that had been nurtured over generations 
in these remote coastal communities. 
While the public service is overwhelmed by re-
construction projects and the evacuee resettle-
ment process is stagnating, the economic and so-
cial disparities that existed among the inhabitants 
before the disaster are also growing larger and 
more visible. According to the aid workers inter-
viewed from Child Fund Japan in Ofunato City and 
PBV in Ishinomaki City, both of which assist evacu-
ees in prefabricated housing units, evacuees with 
financial means tend to move out of the temporary 
shelters quickly as they construct their new home 
without waiting for financial assistance from the 
government, whereas the vulnerable and the mar-
ginalised are left behind. Those with a strong so-
cial network and personal connections also move 
out rapidly as they easily find new job opportuni-
ties. Information Technology (IT) literacy is also 
creating a new disparity. Evacuees who know how 
to surf the Internet are able to find more informa-
tion on the various forms of assistance offered by 
the authorities, NGOs and individuals, while those 
who are not IT-literate have little access to such in-
formation as they rely solely on written material. 
In the absence of an effective public service during 
post-disaster recovery, this disparity is exacerbat-
ing the rifts in communities and leaving vulner-
able populations in even greater destitution and a 
state of traumatism. 
4. THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANT ACCIDENT
4.1. Overview of the event
The earthquake and the ensuing tsunami caused 
serious damage to the installation of Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant situated 230 km north 
of Tokyo. This resulted in hydrogen explosions 
and nuclear meltdowns of three of the six reac-
tors on site, due to the loss of all power supply and 
subsequently of control of the cooling systems. 
Tens of thousands of residents had to evacuate 
their homes as radiation leaked into the atmos-
phere, the sea and the food chain. Japanese offi-
cials rated the incident at level 7 (the maximum) on 
the International Nuclear and Radiological Event 
Scale (INES) defined by International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), which ranks the accident 
as the largest nuclear disaster since the 1986 Cher-
nobyl accident (which is also rated at level 7). The 
post-accident management measures, including 
the decommissioning of the crippled reactors and 
compensation for the nuclear evacuees, are esti-
mated at a cost of more than €200 billion.34
One year after the disaster, there were more than 
160,000 evacuees, known as nuclear evacuees, 
from the Fukushima Prefecture. They represent 
47% of all the persons displaced by the 11 March 
catastrophe.35 A total of 11 municipalities (113,000 
residents) were forced to evacuate following the 
government’s evacuation orders. In addition to this 
forced displacement, there were also cases of vol-
untary evacuation where residents living outside 
of the official evacuation zone became worried 
about radiation effects and decided to flee on their 
own. As the Japanese government and TEPCO re-
vealed the true scale of the radioactive contamina-
tion, there was a gradual increase in the number 
of voluntary evacuees, also referred to as self-evac-
uees. It is very difficult to obtain official statistics 
on the number of self-evacuees but we can esti-
mate these at 47,000 from the difference between 
the total number of evacuees from the Fukushima 
Prefecture and the number of forced evacuees 
from the evacuation zone. In September 2011, the 
number was estimated at 50,327 by the Fukushima 
Prefecture.36 This trend was continuing one year 
34 Source: Japan Centre for Economic Research (JCER) 
(http://www.jcer.or.jp/policy/pdf/pe%28JCER20110 
719%EF%BC%89.pdf). (in Japanese)
35 Source: Reconstruction Agency.
36 Source: MEXT. (http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/
shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afield-
file/ 2011/11/25/1313502_3.pdf).(in Japanese)
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after the disaster: the number of nuclear evacu-
ees is increasing rather than decreasing (Figure 4)
and is also pushing up the overall number of evac-
uees from the 11 March disaster (Figure 5). This 
phenomenon is specific to the 11 March catastro-
phe and is not often observed for other types of 
disaster. 
4.2. Disaster Response 
and Evacuation
This sub-section describes the evacuation process 
implemented following the Fukushima nuclear 
accident. The field interviews found that the 
affected municipalities and population were 
taken by surprise and that the evacuation was 
organised in a chaotic manner, which reveals that 
the scenario of a serious accident had never been 
envisaged or adequately prepared for prior to the 
accident. 
Changes to the evacuation zones
From the onset of the crisis, the Japanese govern-
ment issued various evacuation orders with vastly 
differing instructions and timing. From what 
evacuees said in the interviews, this created a 
great deal of confusion, uncertainty and distress 
among the affected population. Table 3 gives the 
chronology of the different evacuation orders 
issued by the government. As shown in the list, 
these orders were gradually expanded over a 
three-month period starting on 11 March 2011 and 
created four different evacuation zones (Map 4). 
First, a compulsory evacuation order was issued 
Figure 4. Changes in the number of Fukushima evacuees Figure 5. Changes in the total number of evacuees
Source: Japanese Reconstruction Agency.
for the zone within a 2 km radius37 from the 
crippled station and then, in the space of twenty-
four hours, this was extended to a 20 km radius. 
This area was designated as a ‘Restricted Zone’ 
with entry prohibited. Three days after issuing 
the compulsory evacuation order, the government 
then instructed residents living within a 20–30 km 
radius from the station to shelter indoors, in what 
was called the ‘Evacuation Prepared Area’. This 
‘shelter indoors’ order continued for more than a 
month and finally, on 22 April, the same residents 
were advised to self-evacuate. On the same day, 
the government issued a new evacuation order 
to the area where a high airborne radiation level 
had been detected and which was located outside 
of the 20 km radius evacuation zone (‘Deliberate 
Evacuation Area’ shown in Map 4). The residents 
living in this area were instructed to evacuate 
within a month. It was at this time that the govern-
ment began to take the threshold radiation dose 
of 20 millisieverts38 per year (mSv/year) as a basis 
for recommending evacuations. In June 2011, the 
government began to identify ‘hot spots’ where 
an air radiation dose of more than 20mSv/year 
had been detected outside the evacuation zones 
(‘Specific Spots recommended for Evacuation’ 
37 This first evacuation order was issued by the Fukushima 
prefectural government as a precautionary measure.
38 The sievert (Sv) is a unit to measure the radiation dose. 
1 sievert (Sv) = 1,000 millisieverts (mSv). The Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) 
recommends limiting artificial irradiation of the public 
to an average of 1 mSv per year, not including medical 
and occupational exposure (ICRP 2007).
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Table 3. Chronology of the Government’s evacuation orders/recommendations
2011 Target Orders Name of the Zone
11 March 2 km radius from the station Compulsory Evacuation (issued by the 
Fukushima prefectural government)
Restricted Zone
3 km radius Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone
12 March 10 km radius Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone
20 km radius Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone
15 March Between 20–30 km Shelter indoors Evacuation Prepared Area
22 April Between 20–30 km Shelter indoors or evacuation by own 
means
Evacuation Prepared Area
Areas with air radiation dose more than 
20 mSv/year
Evacuation within 1 month Deliberate Evacuation Area
16 June Spots with air radiation dose of over 
20 mSv/year
Recommended for Evacuation Specific Spots Recommended for 
Evacuation
30 Sept. Between 20–30 km Lifting of the order to shelter indoors or 
evacuation by own means
Lifting of Evacuation Prepared Area
Map 4. Official evacuation zones prior to 30 September 2011
Source: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Economy.
Specific Spots recommended
for evacuation    
Deliberate
Evacuation Area  
Evacuation Prepared
Area  
Restricted Area  
Minamisoma  
Namie  
Futaba  
Ookuma  
Tomioka  
Naraha  
Hirono  
Tamura  
Koriyama  
Fukushima  
Iitate  
Katsurao  
Kawauchi  
Kawamata  
Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant (No.1)
Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant (No.2) 
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shown in Map 4). In this fourth category, the 
government first designates the spots after measu-
ring radiation levels on a house-by-house basis 
upon a resident’s request and then issues a ‘recom-
mendation for evacuation’ instead of ‘orders’. If 
the residents of the house qualified as a hot spot 
decide to evacuate, the government provides 
financial assistance. 
On 30 September 2011, the government decid-
ed to do away with the second evacuation zone, 
‘Evacuation Prepared Area’, situated within a 20–
30 km radius from the station. Then in March 2012, 
it proposed reorganising the ‘Restricted Zone’ and 
‘Deliberate Evacuation Area’ into three new areas 
according to the airborne radiation level, thus cre-
ating a zone to which evacuees were expected to 
return. This latest government proposal will be 
analysed in detail in the following sub-section.
Through these different decisions, taken one 
after the other by the government in a rather ad 
hoc manner, both the affected municipalities and 
residents were obliged to evacuate repeatedly from 
one place to another with scant information about 
their future prospects. The field interviews with 
evacuees found that this caused significant psycho-
logical stress for the evacuees during their flight.
Improvised evacuation orders 
The field survey revealed that at the outset of 
the crisis, the municipalities had very little infor-
mation on the accident or the evacuation orders 
issued by the government. Only Futaba town, one 
of the two towns39 hosting the crippled nuclear 
power plant, received the initial evacuation order 
from the central government.40 The other three 
municipalities that we interviewed, Naraha, Mina-
misoma and Iwaki, learnt of the first evacuation 
order only through a television broadcast and 
were not directly notified by the government. 
Naraha town, which hosts another nuclear power 
plant (Fukushima No.2), managed to obtain some 
information on the situation of the Fukushima 
No.1 nuclear power plant from the plant operator, 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO),41 thanks 
to the relationship that it had built up with TEPCO 
over the years. On the basis of this information, 
Naraha town made the decision to evacuate the 
entire population, while Minamisoma City, for 
39 The other town that jointly hosts the crippled nuclear 
station is Okuma town.
40 From the DEVAST interview with the municipality; 
NAIIC, 2012: pp.50-61.
41 TEPCO is the largest of the ten electric utility companies 
in Japan and the fourth largest in the world after the 
German RWE, the French EDF and the German E.ON. It 
was set up in 1951 and de facto nationalised in July 2012 
after the Fukushima nuclear accident.
example, had nothing but the televised broad-
casts to guide its decision. According to the survey 
conducted by NAIIC (NAIIC, 2012: pp.50-61),42 
none of the affected municipalities, except two 
towns hosting the damaged nuclear power station, 
were informed officially of the evacuation order: 
they had to decide on their own to evacuate their 
residents. 
According to the Disaster Prevention Guideline43 
drawn up by the Nuclear Safety Commission of 
Japan (NSC) in 1980 based on the Act on Special 
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Prepar-
edness, Field Emergency Response Headquarters 
(referred to as the Off-Site Centre) should be set 
up within 5 km of the power station in case of an 
accident. The Off-Site Centre, comprising per-
sonnel from the nuclear regulatory agencies, the 
nuclear operator and the concerned municipali-
ties, is in charge of managing the crisis and mak-
ing decisions about the evacuation zone. During 
the 11 March disaster, this Off-Site Centre could 
not function properly given that communication 
equipment was damaged by the earthquake and 
that the personnel who were supposed to assemble 
there did not arrive as they judged the location of 
the centre too close to the affected station and thus 
too dangerous (Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting 
Unit44, 2012: pp.72-74). Given these circumstances, 
the Prime Minister’s Office in Tokyo took over the 
role of the Off-Site Centre when the crisis broke 
out. As a result, the procedure for issuing evacu-
ation orders was never applied as planned in the 
disaster manual and the municipalities were left 
without any specific advice as to how to proceed 
with the evacuation.45 Thus, the mayors had no 
choice but to act on their own initiative and evacu-
ate all the inhabitants regardless of the govern-
ment’s decisions. 
As the municipalities were at a loss at what to 
do, local residents took the advice of TEPCO em-
ployees, families and friends and fled before re-
ceiving the official evacuation orders. Among the 
23 evacuees interviewed, only 9 had decided to 
flee on the basis of the evacuation order from the 
local authority. According to them, those who had 
information from TEPCO employees were the first 
to evacuate, as early as the night of 11 March, while 
the majority fled on the following day.
42 The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investi-
gation Commission (NAIIC) set up by National Diet of 
Japan.
43 http://www.bousai.ne.jp/vis/shiryou/pdf/bousai_
shishin_h2208.pdf
44 Author’s translation of Asahi shimbun tokubetsu houduo bu.
45 Information collected from the interview with the 
affected municipalities.
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Privileged evacuees 
Information on the preoccupying situation at the 
power station thus first reached those who had 
relatives and friends working for TEPCO at the 
damaged station. Many evacuees interviewed told 
the same story. On the night of 11 March, a large 
number of residents had gathered in the evacua-
tion centres as aftershocks were continuing and 
many houses had lost electricity. In the middle of 
that night, a handful of residents who had relatives 
and friends working for TEPCO started to receive 
calls from these contacts on their mobile phones 
and discreetly began to leave the evacuation 
centres as they had been informed on the real state 
of the accident and had been urged to evacuate 
immediately. They thus learnt about the severity 
of the accident and the need for evacuation even 
before the municipality and most of the popula-
tion. What made matters worse is that they did 
not inform their fellow residents in the evacuation 
centres why they were leaving. As one evacuee 
from Futaba town explained: 
On the night of the accident, the families of 
TEPCO employees started to receive calls on their 
mobile phones. After the conversation, they dis-
appeared from the centres. I managed to catch 
one of them and asked why she was leaving. She 
answered that she wanted to go back home in or-
der to pick up something. After she left, I realised 
that her house had been completely destroyed by 
the tsunami and so it was impossible for her to go 
back home. Then, I understood that she did not 
want to tell me that she was actually fleeing from 
the town. I felt I was going crazy with fear when I 
saw people sneaking out of the evacuation centre 
in the middle of the night, one by one, while I was 
left stuck and couldn’t do anything. 
Those residents fortunate enough to know 
someone in TEPCO thus escaped sooner, leaving 
the others behind with no information. This inci-
dent deeply traumatised relationships among resi-
dents, a trauma that will probably take a long time 
to heal. 
Evacuation without preparation
The interviews with affected municipalities and 
evacuees revealed that the organisation of the 
evacuation had been chaotic, as the municipali-
ties had been trying to find ways to evacuate all 
of their residents, a situation for which they had 
never practiced before. Prior to the accident, 
nuclear disaster drills were conducted mainly 
for the employees of the plant operator and the 
municipal offices along with a limited number 
of residents living in the immediate vicinity of 
the nuclear power station, and the crisis scenario 
used had been of a minimal nature. Out of all the 
29 nuclear evacuees interviewed during the field 
research, one person had ever participated in such 
an exercise. A municipal worker also admitted that 
the participation of the residents was limited, a 
maximum of 30 persons at a time, mainly elderly, 
who were available during the day. The evacuee, 
a school teacher in Futaba town, had taken part in 
one nuclear disaster drill and described the exer-
cise as follows:
These drills lacked seriousness. The partici-
pants were gathered in the school yard where a 
hot meal was prepared and served to everybody. 
The atmosphere was rather festive. What’s more, 
we were eating and chatting outside during the 
exercise as if a radiation leak in the air was never 
expected from a nuclear accident. 
According to the Disaster Prevention Guideline 
of the Nuclear Safety Commission, the zone with-
in an 8–10 km radius from the nuclear power sta-
tions is considered as an Emergency Planning Zone 
(EPZ), targeted for nuclear disaster drills and prep-
arations. The guideline explains that the EPZ was 
set up ‘based on the assumption that it is almost 
impossible to occur technically’46 and that ‘between 
8 and 10 km there would be little difference in the 
response to the radiation effect’. In other words, as 
Akira Imai puts it, ‘the nuclear disaster preparation 
was to be implemented only within 8 km and no 
further as the EPZ was designated on the basis of a 
nearly impossible scenario’ and ‘this, indeed, con-
stitutes the basis of the notion in public policy that 
nuclear power stations were accident-free’47 (Imai, 
2012a: p.24). The NSC’s report on nuclear disaster 
drills conducted during 2008 in 11 prefectures, for 
example, shows that the evacuation exercise for 
residents was conducted only within a radius of 
1–3 km from the stations.48 Therefore, at the time 
of the crisis, the municipalities and residents were 
not at all prepared for such an evacuation and thus 
completely at a loss. As a result, in the absence of 
an organised evacuation led by the municipalities 
as planned in the disaster manual, many people 
self-evacuated, using their own cars if they were 
lucky enough to have some fuel left. This created 
an enormous traffic jam on the escape route and 
delayed the whole evacuation process, leaving the 
population significantly distressed.
46 Author’s translation.
47 Author’s translation.
48 Source: NSC (http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/
sisetubo/sisetubo019/ssiryo5.pdf). (in Japanese)
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Evacuation without information
The field research also found that evacuees had 
not been informed on the severity of the acci-
dent or the eventual radiation risk at the time of 
evacuation. Even when residents were ordered to 
evacuate by the municipal authorities, they were 
not told how long the displacement was going to 
last or what was happening at the nuclear power 
station, let alone what the radiation risk would be. 
As a result, many residents left without any extra 
clothes, food or money, thinking that it would be 
a matter of three or four days before they could 
go back home. According to the NAIIC report, 
only 20% of the residents in Futaba and Naraha 
towns, both of which host nuclear power plants, 
knew about the accident on the first day (NAIIC, 
2012: p.52). The remaining 80% of residents learnt 
about the accident only on the following day when 
the evacuation order was finally issued by the 
municipalities, twelve hours after the first evacua-
tion order issued by the government. The same 
report revealed that only 10% of the residents were 
aware of the first evacuation order issued by the 
government. 
The interviews with evacuees and municipali-
ties confirmed that the information on radia-
tion risk was not communicated to them by the 
central and prefectural governments, despite the 
fact that this (albeit incomplete) information had 
been in authorities’ possession from the outset of 
the crisis. The Japanese government had invested 
a total of €130 million in developing the System 
for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose 
Information (SPEEDI) since the 1980s (Asahi 
Shimbun Special Reporting Unit, 2012: p.21; Mat-
suoka, 2012: p.130). The system is designed to 
predict the likely pathway of radioactive materi-
als emitted from a damaged nuclear power plant 
and carried by winds and rains, by calculating 
the weather and geographical conditions of the 
concerned area. After the accident, it was dis-
covered that the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) was ac-
tively utilising the SPEEDI from the first day of 
the accident to predict the pathway of radiation 
leaks from the crippled station. This information 
had even been communicated to the US army as 
early as 14 March 2011, three days after the ac-
cident, through the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs upon a specific request made by the US 
government (Matsuoka, 2012: p.130). Further-
more, this information was also transmitted to 
the prefectural government of Fukushima as ear-
ly as 12 March 2011 via 86 e-mails sent by MEXT’s 
Nuclear Safety Technology Centre. However, the 
Fukushima Prefecture not only failed to inform 
the concerned municipalities but also deleted 
most of these e-mails.49 When interrogated as to 
why this SPEEDI information had been deleted, 
the Fukushima Prefecture explained that ‘these 
e-mails contained attachment files that were too 
heavy for our system to deal with’. When the gov-
ernment was interrogated as to why the informa-
tion from SPEEDI was not made public in a timely 
manner, Special Advisor to the then Prime Minis-
ter Goshi Hosono explained that it was in order to 
‘avoid panic among the population’.50 
While the SPEEDI information was kept from 
the public, MEXT dispatched a radiation monitor-
ing team to Namie town, which lay in the radioac-
tive pathway predicted by SPEEDI, as early as 15 
March 2011 (Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting 
Unit, 2012: pp.61-62). There, the team measured 
a radiation dose rate as high as 330 microsieverts 
(μSv) per hour (see Box 1).51 Namie town was situ-
ated outside of the official evacuation zone (31 km 
north west of the nuclear station) and thus all the 
residents were still living in the town. Information 
on this high radiation dose rate was not communi-
cated to the Namie administration or the residents 
and was made public only on the MEXT website 
the following day: a point was indicated on a blank 
map with no name shown for the place where this 
dose rate had been detected. In the meantime, 
the government spokesman repeated a televised 
message that ‘this radiation dosage poses no 
49 The newspaper Tokyo Shimbun, ‘Kakusan yosoku: fuku-
shima-ken ga sakujo syazai’ (Author’s translation: 
The Fukushima Prefecture apologizes for deleting the 
SPEEDI information’, 21 April 2012.
50 Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting Unit, 2012: p.76; 
Joint Government/TEPCO Press Conference held on 2 
May 2011 (http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/
godokaiken_110502.pdf). (in Japanese)
51 The newspaper, Tokyo Shimbun, ‘SPEEDI information 
used by the government prior to being made public’, 12 
June 2012; Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting Unit, 2012.
Box 1. Basic information on air radiation dose 
levels
 m Airborne radiation can be measured by a Geiger counter, which detects 
particles of ionising radiation.
 m 1 millisievert (mSv) per year is the reference dose level in normal 
exposure situations, recommended by International Commission on 
Radiation Protection (ICRP). It is the dose limit for artificial radiation 
exposure (thus excluding natural radiation exposure) set for the public, 
excluding medical and occupational exposures.
 m 1 mSv/year can be calculated on average as 0.11 microsievert (µSv)/
hour.
 m 0.001 Sv = 1 mSv = 1,000 µSv
 m The average air radiation dose rate in Fukushima Prefecture before the 
accident was 0.038 µSv/hour.6
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immediate risk to human health52’ (Asahi Shimbun 
Special Reporting Unit, 2012: p.54). Consequently, 
many evacuees were unnecessarily exposed to 
high levels of radiation during the initial phase of 
the evacuation, especially those who fled to the 
north-west of the station. This zone was in fact the 
pathway of the radiation clouds that SPEEDI had 
already predicted, but such information had not 
been shared with those concerned. The SPEEDI 
information was finally released to the public on 
23 March 2011, twelve days after the accident, and 
additional evacuation orders for residents living in 
the area with high radiation levels were not issued 
until 22 April 2011, one month after the public re-
lease. As the NAIIC report states: ‘Some residents 
were evacuated to areas with high radiation lev-
els and were then neglected, receiving no further 
evacuation orders until April’ (NAIIC, 2012: p.19), 
and by acting in this way, ‘the government effec-
tively abandoned their responsibility for public 
safety’ (Ibid, p.38). 
Emergency response measures against 
radiation exposure
In addition to the lack of information on the radia-
tion risk, other emergency measures implemented 
by the authorities came under criticism in the wake 
of the disaster. These measures involved, in parti-
cular, the emergency medical care aimed at redu-
cing the health effects of radiation exposure. The 
final report by the Investigation Committee on the 
Fukushima Accident commissioned by the Cabinet 
Office examined some of these measures in detail, 
notably the full-body screening procedure53 for 
decontamination and the administration of stable 
iodine tablets (ICANPS, 2011: pp.353-361). 
Prior to the accident, the Fukushima Prefec-
ture had established an external contamination 
screening procedure for residents, whereby those 
exposed to high radiation levels would receive de-
contamination treatment in case of an accident. 
In the procedure, the threshold level triggering 
this treatment was set at 40 Bq/cm2 (equivalent 
to 13,000 cpm).54 Two days after the accident, 
the prefectural government decided to raise this 
52 Author’s translation.
53 The screening procedure involves measuring the level of 
radioactive contamination on a person’s outer body by 
placing dose measurement equipment over the body’s 
surface. The medical team then is able to determine 
whether or not a person has been contaminated by radi-
oactivity and thus needs to be decontaminated.
54 The becquerel (Bq) is a unit of radioactivity. 1 Bq rep-
resents the amount of radioactive material that will 
undergo one nucleus decay per second. Counts per min-
ute (cpm) is a measure of the detection rate of ionisation 
events due to radioactivity.
screening level to 100,000 cpm: eight times higher 
than the pre-accident level. The Nuclear Safety 
Commission of Japan (NSC), although it had ini-
tially expressed some concerns, finally endorsed 
this threshold level on 19 March 2011. As a result, 
full-body decontamination procedures, including 
removal of contaminated clothes, showers and 
other preventive measures such as administration 
of iodine tablets, were not systematically applied 
to people whose external contamination level read 
below 100,000 cpm. 
On 16 March 2011, the NSC recommended the 
administration of stable iodine tablets for those 
residents still inside the restricted zone within a 
20 km radius from the crippled power station. In 
line with the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, all the 
concerned municipalities had a sufficient stock of 
stable iodine tablets for the residents in case of 
an accident. However, the Fukushima prefectural 
government did not communicate the NSC’s in-
struction to the concerned municipalities since it 
had already confirmed that everybody had evacu-
ated and that nobody remained in the area (infor-
mation that was not correct according to our inter-
views with evacuees). The ICANPS interim report 
published in December 2011 presents the case of 
Miharu town, situated 50 km from the crippled 
nuclear station. Assuming a high level of exposure 
to radiation, the town decided on its own initia-
tive to advise residents to take stable iodine tab-
lets. When Fukushima Prefecture was informed of 
this decision, it issued an order to the Miharu town 
officials to suspend the distribution and recall the 
tablets on the grounds that no such instruction 
had yet been given by the central government. Dis-
regarding this instruction, the Miharu municipal-
ity decided to go ahead and distribute the iodine 
tablets to the residents. As a result, apart from Mi-
haru town, no evacuees or other concerned popu-
lations in Fukushima took the stable iodine tablets 
during the disaster due to absence of instructions 
from the central and prefectural governments.
These examples show that the authorities did 
not properly follow the emergency procedures that 
were inscribed in their contingency manuals and 
hence failed to provide a maximum protection to 
the population against radiation exposures. These 
incidents led the population to lose trust in the 
handling of central and prefectural governments 
in effectively mitigating the effects of the accident 
and doing their best to protect their citizens.
4.3. Perception of risk
Prior to the accident, both evacuees and munici-
palities believed that the nuclear power station 
was extremely safe and that a severe accident was 
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almost impossible. The following section explores 
the circumstances that existed in these commu-
nities before the accident and analyses how 
this perception of nuclear risk heightened their 
vulnerability when faced with an actual disaster. 
Changes in the risk perception of nuclear energy 
among both the evacuees and the general public 
are also closely examined in order to demonstrate 
the immediate and profound impact that the acci-
dent produced on Japanese society. 
The myth of ‘absolute safety’
During the interviews, most of the evacuees 
pointed out the myth of ‘absolute safety’ that had 
underpinned their confidence in nuclear power 
stations prior to the accident. During our field 
survey, the majority of interviewees said that they 
had believed that the nuclear stations were absolu-
tely safe. Most interestingly, a couple of evacuees 
responded that they had previously never given 
thought to the nuclear power plant as it had been 
built long before their birth and they took its exis-
tence for granted. An evacuee from Naraha town 
recalls:
TEPCO used to tell us that its nuclear power 
plant was the safest in the world and that the oc-
currence of an accident was impossible. We were 
all brainwashed by them…
As another evacuee from Futaba town 
remembers:
Every year TEPCO organised a town festival 
through which they carried out their informa-
tion campaign, telling the residents that the nu-
clear power station was absolutely safe. I won-
dered, if it was so safe, why do they have to come 
every year to tell us the same thing? TEPCO also 
transferred 10,000 yen (€100) to all the house-
holds in town every year [as a sign of apprecia-
tion for hosting its nuclear facilities]. When I 
think of it now, why did they regularly send us 
money if their station was so safe and there was 
nothing to feel guilty about? 
Although few in number, there were also evacu-
ees who had been sceptical about this myth. These 
evacuees are mainly people who had worked on 
site for TEPCO or those who, as members of their 
Local Nuclear Resident Committee, had been in 
regular contact with TEPCO and the state nuclear 
regulatory agencies.55 Those who were connected 
55 This committee is composed of residents and members 
of the town assembly to represent the residents’ inter-
ests in matters concerning the nuclear power plant. It 
had regular contacts with the plant operator, TEPCO, 
and the nuclear regulatory agencies.
in some way with the nuclear facility knew that the 
nuclear power stations were not failsafe, but they 
did not share their opinion with others at the time 
as it was considered as taboo for them to question 
the safety of nuclear installations. Their ultimate 
interest was to maintain the presence of the nu-
clear power plant on account of the benefits that 
it brought to their community, and questioning its 
safety was regarded as compromising this mutual 
interest (see the section below ‘Nuclear-dependant 
communities’). 
Since the introduction of nuclear energy in 1955, 
the myth of ‘absolute safety’ – according to which 
a severe nuclear accident could never occur in Ja-
pan – has been nurtured by nuclear advocates in 
industry, government and academia, initially in 
order to convince rural communities to accept the 
installation of nuclear power stations and later to 
gain the population’s continuing support. Accord-
ing to Yoichi Funabashi and Kay Kitazawa, who are 
the main authors of the report of the Independent 
Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nu-
clear Accident (IIC) established by the Rebuild Ja-
pan Initiative Foundation, this myth was regarded 
as necessary by nuclear proponents in order to 
overcome the general public’s strong opposition 
to nuclear power, an aversion that had its roots in 
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
(Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012: p.14). The authors 
explain that the disaster risk in the nuclear energy 
sector had been deliberately downplayed by these 
interest groups over the years. As time passed, the 
myth became ingrained in the thinking of nuclear 
regulators and plant operators, who also finally 
came to believe that an accident was impossible 
(IIC, 2012: p.298). The myth went as far as to mis-
construe and distort common-sense logic. The IIC 
report describes the myth as ‘the notion of safety 
where questioning is forbidden and logic is for-
mulated in such a way as to preserve an already 
established idea’.56
At a symposium organised by Waseda Univer-
sity in March 2012, Professor Shunichi Murooka 
of Waseda University presented an interesting ex-
ample to illustrate how this myth functioned prior 
to the disaster.57 He explained that, in the wake of 
the Chernobyl accident, many nuclear facilities in 
Europe installed vent filters in order to avoid pol-
luting the air with highly radioactive materials in 
56 P.324; author’s translation.
57 Presentation made by Professor Shunichi Morooka 
(Waseda University) at the Symposium on ‘One Year 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukush-
ima Nuclear Disaster: The Cause, Impact, Countermeas-
ure and Reconstruction from a Complex Mega Crisis’, 
held at Waseda University on 8 March 2012. 
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the event of a severe accident. In Japan, however, 
the authorities and the nuclear operator consid-
ered that, if they fitted such filters, this would send 
out a message to the public that a severe accident 
might indeed happen one day and they therefore 
decided against this precautionary measure. Ac-
cording to Professor Murooka, had these vent fil-
ters been installed, the Fukushima accident would 
not have emitted as much radioactive material in 
the air as it did. The same logic governed the or-
ganisation of disaster drills for residents. When Ni-
gata Prefecture, host to one of the nuclear power 
plants, planned to conduct nuclear accident drills 
for an earthquake scenario in 2010, the former Nu-
clear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), which 
reported to METI, advised that such drills would 
cause ‘unnecessary anxiety and misunderstand-
ing’ among residents and thus suggested that they 
should not be implemented (Funabashi and Ki-
tazawa, 2012: p.14). In Futaba and Naraha towns, 
disaster drills were conducted on a minimal scale 
with a minor incident scenario in which only those 
residents within the immediate vicinity of the 
power station were to be evacuated. In the logic of 
the safety myth, disaster preparation in itself had 
become a source of contradiction: if the nuclear 
power stations are so safe, why prepare the resi-
dents for an accident that would never happen? As 
a result, the local population was not sufficiently 
prepared for a disaster and eventual evacuation 
and, prior to the accident, their risk perception 
of nuclear power plants remained very low or, in 
some cases, non-existent.
The safety myth shattered after the disaster
All the evacuees interviewed, except a few of those 
who were employed directly by the nuclear power 
plants, said that they had completely lost confi-
dence in the safety of nuclear power plants and 
wanted their towns to abandon nuclear energy. 
This tendency is also observed within the general 
public. Opinion polls taken prior to the accident 
showed that the majority of the Japanese popu-
lation were in favour of stepping up the nuclear 
share of the energy mix. In the 2009 census 
conducted by the Cabinet Office, close to 60% 
of the respondents were in favour of promoting 
nuclear energy and another 20% were for main-
taining the current nuclear energy production.58 
In total, almost 80% of the respondents approved 
of nuclear energy in 2009. However, in June 2011, 
three months after the accident, the opinion poll 
conducted by the Nippon Housou Kyoukai (NHK), 
Japan’s national public broadcasting organisation, 
58 The survey result available in Japanese at: http://
www8.cao.go.jp/survey/tokubetu/h21/h21-genshi.pdf
revealed a complete turn-around with those in 
favour of nuclear energy falling sharply to 28%, 
while the proportion of those preferring a reduc-
tion or halt of nuclear energy rose to 66%.59 One 
year after the accident, in March 2012, the same 
opinion poll found 71% were in favour of phasing 
out and abandoning nuclear energy, while only 
23% were in favour of promoting or maintai-
ning nuclear energy.60 Figure 6 below summa-
rises these results and shows a reversal in public 
opinion toward nuclear energy in the wake of the 
Fukushima disaster.
Among the nuclear evacuees, this U-turn is even 
more pronounced. According to the survey con-
ducted by Professor Akira Imai from Fukushima 
University in February 2012, the opposition to 
nuclear energy among the Fukushima evacuees 
rose to 82% (Imai, 2012a: p.33). Considering that 
an absolute majority of the local population sup-
ported the nuclear installation prior to the disas-
ter (Kainuma, 2011), a fact also confirmed by our 
interviews, the change of opinion is most striking 
among the evacuees from those municipalities 
hosting the nuclear power plants. During the inter-
views, many voiced strong opposition to restarting 
the nuclear power stations (all the stations were 
in temporary shut-down for stress tests at the time 
of the interviews) and to nuclear energy in gen-
eral, stating that there was no such thing as 100% 
safe nuclear power generation. At the same time, 
they also emphasised that the specific situations 
of the municipalities hosting nuclear power plants 
should be taken into account for any decision on 
whether or not to abandon nuclear energy. Being 
acutely aware of the benefits that a nuclear power 
plant also brings to a town in terms of job creation 
and economic prosperity (see the section ‘Nuclear-
dependant communities’), they did not wish to 
impose their opinion in favour of ceasing nuclear 
activities on the other hosting communities. 
4.4. Prospects of return
The prospect of return for nuclear evacuees 
remained uncertain one year after the disaster. The 
following sub-section analyses the situation facing 
nuclear evacuees with respect to their return and 
explores why the evacuees remain ambivalent on 
this question. 
59 The survey result available in Japanese at: http://
www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/
pdf/110709.pdf
60 The survey result available in Japanese at: http://www.
nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/120401.
pdf
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The question of return is highly politicised
Unlike the return of tsunami evacuees, the return 
of nuclear evacuees has become a highly politi-
cised issue one year on from the disaster. In the 
aftermath of the Fukushima accident, as early 
as 19 April 2011, the government raised the dose 
limit for public exposure to radiation from 1 mSv/
year to 20 mSv/year.61 Accordingly, the authori-
ties, including the Fukushima prefectural govern-
ment and several affected municipalities, began 
to emphasise that it was safe to return and live 
in areas with an annual radiation dose of less 
than 20 mSv. Policy priorities have thus focused 
on decontamination operations to ‘cleanse’ the 
affected communities of radiation and on the early 
return of evacuees. On the other hand, our field 
research found that the majority of evacuees are 
still anxious about the radioactive contamina-
tion of their houses and communities and remain 
highly sceptical about the effectiveness of deconta-
mination operations. They are thus still undecided 
about their return. 
In March 2012, one year on from the accident, 
the government proposed a new plan to reorgan-
ise the evacuation zone into three categories de-
pending on the air radiation doses measured.62 
The first area, which has an air radiation dose of 
less than 20 mSv/year, is designated for intensive 
61 The reference dose for artificial irradiation for the pub-
lic, excluding medical and occupational exposures, 
in ‘regular exposure situations’ defined by Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) 
is 1 mSv/year (ICRP, 2007). The Japanese government 
refers to the ICRP’s recommendation on the reference 
dose fixed for ‘existing radiation exposure conditions’, 
applied to occupational exposure situations and residual 
exposure situations after a nuclear reactor accident, to 
justify its decision to raise the dose limit to 20 mSv/year. 
The reference dose for ‘existing radiation exposure con-
ditions’ is between 1–20 mSv/year according to ICRP.
62 Source: METI (http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/
nuclear/pdf/20120330_02f.pdf).
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Source: Cabinet Office for 2005-2009 and NHK census for 2011-2012.
decontamination operations and the early return 
of evacuees. The second zone is defined as an area 
with a radiation dose of between 20–50 mSv/year, 
with return not deemed feasible for at least two to 
three years. The third zone is the area with more 
than 50 mSv/year, where the return will be diffi-
cult for at least the next five years (Table 4). 
Table 4. The government’s proposal on the reorganisation 
of the evacuation zone
Area Name Threshold 
Radiation Dose 
(airborne)
Timing of Return
1 Areas for which 
evacuation orders 
are ready to be 
lifted
Less than 20 mSv/
year
Intensive 
decontamination 
and early return
2 Areas in which the 
residents are not 
permitted to live
Between 20-50 
mSv/year
Evacuees cannot 
return for at least 
2-3 years
3 Areas where it is 
expected that the 
residents will find 
it difficult to return 
to for a long time
More than 50 mSv/
year
Evacuees cannot 
return for at least 
5 years
Source: Reconstruction Agency.
Box 2. The government’s compensation scheme 
for nuclear evacuees 
The compensation scheme for the nuclear evacuees following the reorganisa-
tion of the evacuation zone was disclosed by the government in July 2012. 
The main elements of the scheme are as follows:
Psychological damage caused by the evacuation
In addition to the reimbursement of transportation and accommodation costs 
related to the evacuation, TEPCO will pay 100,000 yen (€1,000) per person 
per month from the date of the accident until the date when the evacuation 
orders are lifted by the government. 
Damages to fixed-assets (houses and land)
As for private houses and lands located in the third zone (difficult to return 
to for 5 years), TEPCO will pay compensation equivalent to the pre-accident 
value of such assets. Those located in the first and the second zones will be 
compensated proportionally to the number of years the elapse until the lifting 
of evacuation orders for these zones. 
Damages to household effects
The amount of compensation varies according to the size of families. For 
example, a family of two adults and two children will receive between 
€50,000–67,000 on the basis of the newly classified areas. 
Economic damages 
TEPCO pays an amount equivalent to the salary that an evacuee was earning 
prior to the accident (for a period of two years) and compensates for loss of 
business earnings based on the average profits that business owners were 
making before the accident (calculated on the previous five years for agricul-
ture and forestry businesses, and three years for other business activities).
Source: METI. For further details, the following documents are available on the METI website in 
Japanese: http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/institution.pdf; http://www.meti.go.jp/pr
ess/2012/07/20120720001/20120720001-1.pdf
STUDY 05/20133 2 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Area 1: Areas to which evacuation orders 
are ready to be lifted
Area 2: Areas in which the residents
are not permitted to live
Area 3: Areas where it is expected that 
the residents have difficulties in returning 
for a long time
Restricted Area
Deliberate Evacuation Area
Map 5. Reorganisation of the evacuation zone (as from August 2012)
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
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However, this proposal raised many concerns 
among the affected communities, obliging the 
government to hold consultations with each mu-
nicipality. In August 2012, only 5 out of 11 affected 
towns had officially adopted the plan, while the 
other 6 were still in consultation and undecided.63 
According to the interviews, their main cause for 
concern was that the proposal splits towns into 
three areas each benefiting from different levels 
of financial assistance (Box 2), which is likely to 
create jealousies among the residents and threat-
en the cohesiveness of the community. Secondly, 
it creates patches of land to which residents can 
return while the rest remain restricted access are-
as (Map 5). During the interviews, several evacu-
ees questioned the feasibility of returning to such 
areas if vital social infrastructures such as clinics, 
schools and shops are located in the second or the 
third zone and thus simply not accessible. Third-
ly, many evacuees, especially those with small 
children, are deeply anxious about radiation ef-
fects if they return. They remain sceptical of the 
new safety standard of ‘less than 20 mSv/year’, 
despite the government’s reassurances. 
Since the redefinition of the evacuation zone, 
the government, Fukushima Prefecture and sev-
eral affected municipalities have mobilised to 
encourage evacuees to return to the localities 
classified as Area 1, which has annual air radia-
tion dose below 20 mSv. For the municipal gov-
ernments, the question of return is a matter of 
their own survival: if the residents do not return, 
the town will disintegrate and ultimately disap-
pear from the map, thus putting their existence 
and identity into jeopardy. With slogans such as 
‘Without the revitalisation of Fukushima, there 
is no revitalisation of Japan’64 and ‘Don’t give up 
Fukushima!’, the authorities are setting priority 
on the ‘normalisation’ of the Fukushima disaster 
situation and urging the evacuees to return and 
reconstruct their lives. The majority of evacuees, 
however, are still fearful about the risks of radia-
tion. One evacuee from Naraha town expressed 
his frustration:
The government forced us to evacuate in the 
first place. Now it’s trying to force us to return 
without much information. When it comes 
to the issue of return, I feel as if we will do it 
at our own risk. We don’t know whether the 
63 Minamisoma, Iitate, Tamura, Kawauchi and Naraha 
have accepted the government’s proposal. Tomioka, 
Okuma, Futaba, Namie, Katsurao and Kawamata have 
not yet made a decision. 
64 Prime Minister’s speech at a press conference on 2 Sep-
tember 2011 available in Japanese at: http://www.kantei.
go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2011/0902kaiken.html.
government will compensate the medical fees 
when we get sick [from radiation effects] after 
returning.
The authorities’ emphasis on return is thus 
making the evacuee communities mistrustful of 
the public authorities and becoming a source of 
grievances. Meanwhile, the municipalities are 
confronted with the extremely difficult task of 
making the right choice for a future that both en-
sures the evacuees’ best interests and maintains 
their community’s cohesiveness and identity.
The nuclear evacuees’ unwillingness to 
return
During the field research, the majority of evacuees 
said either that they wished to return but knew this 
would not be possible, or simply that they did not 
wish to return. This clearly shows the reality that 
nuclear evacuees are facing on the ground. Most 
express a wish to return, which in fact means that 
they will not probably return considering the situa-
tion, but they do not want to state this outright. In 
the field interviews, the DEVAST research team 
often felt that the evacuees were hesitant to give a 
clear response to the question of return, as return 
is closely linked to their community’s cohesive-
ness and survival; any expression of unwillingness 
to return could be seen as lacking solidarity and 
betraying their community. The issue of return, 
therefore, has become an almost taboo subject and 
a fault line dividing the evacuee communities.
Professor Akira Imai from Fukushima University 
conducted a panel survey among the nuclear evac-
uees in which same questions were asked to same 
interviewees over time. He then analysed how 
their opinions had evolved. The first survey was 
conducted three months after the accident in June 
2011, the second six months after in September 
2011 and the third twelve months after in February 
2012 (Imai, 2011a; 2011c; 2012a). The survey find-
ings show that the willingness to return decreases 
with the passage of time and an increasingly real-
istic picture of the hometown situation (Figure 7). 
The evacuees who expressed their wish to return 
in June 2011 represented 61.7%, whereas in the lat-
est survey conducted in February 2012 this figure 
had dropped to only 36.1%. In addition, a clear di-
vision of opinion was observed between the gen-
erations under the age of fifty and the over-sixties 
(Figure 8). According to a resident survey con-
ducted by Naraha town in February 2012, the pro-
portion of evacuees aged between twenty and fifty 
who expressed a willingness to return was around 
34%, while more than half of those aged over sixty 
declared their wish to return (Takaki, 2012). In the 
same survey, over half of the respondents (56%) 
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stated that a decrease in the radiation level was a 
condition of their return, with their second biggest 
concern being the rehabilitation of basic social in-
frastructure (29.7%). During our own interviews, 
evacuees also raised the issues of employment 
prospects and the decontamination of their houses 
as conditions of their return. But the phrase that 
we heard repeatedly in all the municipalities is: 
‘people under sixty years old will probably not re-
turn as they are afraid of the radiation effects on 
their children’. If this turns out to be the case, the 
return of the evacuees aged over sixty will also 
pose enormous challenges. Several of those inter-
viewed raised the following question: ‘if there are 
no shops open in town, no doctors and nurses in 
the clinics and no helpers in elderly homes, how 
can we return and rebuild our lives?’. The prospect 
of return therefore remains uncertain and contin-
ues to cause a great deal of psychological stress for 
the evacuees.
The government’s contradictory policies for 
return
During the interviews, the municipal workers 
and evacuees from the towns hosting the nuclear 
power plants often expressed frustration at the 
contradictory policies proposed by the govern-
ment with regard to return. In March 2012, when 
the government proposed a reorganisation of the 
evacuation zones, it also put forward a plan to 
set up an interim storage facility for the contami-
nated soil collected during the decontamination 
operations around the two nuclear power plants 
in Fukushima Prefecture. To this end, it officially 
requested the four hosting communities65 to accept 
the plan. However, both the municipalities and the 
evacuees criticised this plan as being at odds with 
the government’s policy for decontamination and 
65 Futaba, Okuma, Tomioka and Naraha towns. 
the early return of evacuees. They fear that if they 
accept the installation of an interim storage faci-
lity, they will not be able to return to the commu-
nity given that highly irradiated soil will be stored 
in the vicinity.
The field interviews clearly evidenced a situa-
tion of ‘passing the buck’ between the central and 
municipal governments on the issue of return. 
Municipal governments sometimes asked the cen-
tral authority to make a decision on their return 
to ensure that the final responsibility for assisting 
their returning and for assuring the welfare of the 
returning communities would remain with the 
central government. On the other hand, the cen-
tral government insists that it is up to each munici-
pality whether or not to accept the plan for the re-
organisation of the evacuation zone. In reality, the 
municipalities and evacuees have had little choice 
but to accept the plan as no other alternatives are 
proposed by the government. As things stand, nei-
ther the government nor the municipality have 
forced evacuees to return and thus neither party is 
ultimately responsible for the future of returnees.
Decontamination or contamination-
transfer?
Evacuees refer to the decontamination of their 
community as a key condition for their return. 
Yet, during our field survey, most of them were 
profoundly sceptical as to its effectiveness. Imai’s 
survey revealed that 80% of the evacuees were 
unconvinced by the results of the authorities’ 
decontamination operations since these are 
proving much less efficient than initially expected 
(Imai, 2012a). The standard decontamination 
operation involves removing topsoil, cutting away 
undergrowth and pressure washing roof tiles and 
asphalt roads.66 In reality, the Fukushima evacuees 
66 Source: Ministry of Environment (http://josen.env.
go.jp/material/download/pdf/josen.pdf).
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Figure 7. Changes in willingness to return Figure 8. Willingness to return according to age
Source: Akira Imai, The Third Resident Survery, 2012. Source: Naraha town’s resident survey in February 2012.
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and residents have discovered, using their own 
Geiger counters, that if it rained or snowed after 
the operation, the radiation level went up again.67 
The survey conducted in Fukushima City by the 
international NGO, Friends of the Earth, showed 
that, after a decontamination operation, the radia-
tion level had decreased by only 6.7% on average 
at 1 m above the ground (Yamauchi, 2011). Another 
problem is that the removed contaminated topsoil 
is put into plastic bags and stockpiled next to the 
site or inside the city limits, given that so far no 
specialised storage facility has been designated to 
stock the contaminated soil satisfactorily. As long 
as the removed soil is left on site, radiation levels 
in the area are not likely to decrease to any great 
extent. Furthermore, when roads and roofs are 
cleaned with water, the contaminated water ends 
up in the sewers or is absorbed into the surroun-
ding fields and remains radioactive. This means 
that the decontamination operation is merely 
transferring radioactive materials from one place 
to another. Once materials become contaminated, 
their radioactivity cannot be eliminated simply 
by ‘cleansing’. One evacuee from Futaba town 
expressed his frustration as follows:
There are many farmers in our town. When 
we return, if we cannot eat what we grow on our 
farms and we cannot drink the water because it 
comes from the contaminated river, how are we 
going to live?
Another evacuee also from Futaba town added:
There are many radiation hot spots in individ-
ual houses as well. The authorities say ‘it’s safe 
to live in your area because the radiation level is 
OK but please don’t get close to the four corners 
of your house [where the rain water drops from 
the gutter]’. When I actually went to my house 
and measured the radiation level, I was shocked 
to detect a very high radiation level around the 
gutters and the corners of window frames. It is 
impossible to live in a house that has hot spots in 
different places.
In addition, radioactivity is often concentrated 
in the vegetation and soil of nearby hills, moun-
tains and river banks. Many evacuees remarked 
that decontaminating the mountains was an al-
most impossible task. As the affected communi-
ties are often in a rural setting surrounded by hills 
and mountains, the evacuees are highly sceptical 
about the effectiveness of the decontamination op-
erations and the prospects of their eventual return. 
In this context, some evacuees have started to 
67 Information obtained from the evacuees and the resi-
dents of Fukushima City during our interviews.
question whether it is useful for the government to 
pursue its decontamination policy, which receives 
a large slice of the reconstruction budget. 
4.5. Post-disaster challenges
This sub-section presents the major challenges 
facing the evacuees, the residents of Fukushima 
Prefecture, the affected municipalities, the govern-
ment and the Japanese population at large one 
year after the Fukushima accident. 
Discrimination towards the ‘contaminated’
Some evacuees that we interviewed complained 
that they had suffered from discrimination both 
during their displacement and in their place of 
refuge. In the early stages of the crisis, the evacuees 
from Fukushima Prefecture were considered as 
‘contaminated’ by the rest of the population. They 
often met with different forms of discrimination 
and, in some cases, were openly avoided by the 
public. As Japanese vehicle number plates indicate 
the place of registration, evacuees who fled by 
car were easily identifiable. A couple of evacuees 
mentioned that the cars with a Fukushima number 
plate were banned from using certain roads 
or entering certain localities. An evacuee from 
Okuma town recounted one of her experiences: 
When I evacuated to Niigata Prefecture 
[200 km west of the Fukushima Daiichi plant], I 
was really discriminated against… For example, 
when I went to a public bath to take a shower, 
there was a hand-written notice saying ‘Entry 
prohibited to persons from Fukushima’. I was 
really shocked. Actually, I experienced the same 
thing even in Aizu region [the western part of 
Fukushima Prefecture; 100 km from the nuclear 
station]. Although Aizu is part of Fukushima 
Prefecture, I saw a notice saying that the place 
is reserved for non-Fukushima people. Moreover, 
every time I parked my car in a supermarket car 
park, when I came back to my car, there were no 
cars parked around mine. In fact, because of my 
number plate, everybody could see that I came 
from the area included in the evacuation zone. 
So no one wanted to park their car close to mine.
Some evacuees also mentioned that their chil-
dren were often bullied at school in the towns 
where they had taken refuge: they are seen as ‘con-
taminated’ or called ‘Mr/Miss Fukushima’ by other 
pupils. As the crippled nuclear power station and 
the Prefecture share the same name, ‘Fukushima’, 
the accident has been amalgamated with the Pre-
fecture and the entire Fukushima region is now 
viewed as ‘contaminated’ or ‘condemned’. The ad-
ditional traumatism of discrimination is one of the 
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key aspects that differentiates the nuclear evacua-
tion from the displacement caused by the tsunami. 
The widespread image of Fukushima as ‘contami-
nated’ and the self-image of nuclear evacuees as 
irradiated and discriminated against will have a 
lasting effect in the minds of the evacuees and the 
rest of the population. 
Nuclear-dependent communities
When explaining the pre-accident context, the 
municipal workers and evacuees from the towns 
that host the nuclear power plants often referred 
to the ‘special relationship’ they had enjoyed with 
the plant operator, TEPCO. They describe it as a 
relationship of ‘co-existence and mutual pros-
perity’. The municipal officers from both Futaba 
and Naraha towns confessed that it was difficult 
to criticise TEPCO even after the accident, as 
they were only too aware of TEPCO’s substan-
tial contribution to the prosperity of their towns. 
Hiroshi Kainuma explains, in his book entitled 
Theory of Fukushima: How was the ‘Nuclear 
Village’ Formed?,68 the process whereby a town 
ends up becoming utterly dependent on the exis-
tence of a nuclear power plant for its economic 
survival. Whenever a nuclear installation plan is 
proposed, various upstream financial incentives 
are generally offered by the government and the 
nuclear operator so as to convince local residents 
to support the plan. The sites targeted for these 
nuclear facilities were often remote and sparsely 
populated regions, largely impoverished and with 
little industrial fabric. Traditionally, the men in 
such localities have to move to bigger towns and 
cities to find employment, leaving their wives 
and children behind. However, when a nuclear 
plant arrives and creates jobs for a hefty share 
of a town’s population69 and the local govern-
ment receives large amounts of tax and subsi-
dies, the town’s economy flourishes and the 
presence of nuclear industry becomes indispen-
sable to the residents’ livelihoods. According to 
Kainuma, before the arrival of a nuclear facility, 
these towns were among the poorest municipa-
lities in Fukushima Prefecture. Yet, by 1977, six 
years after the arrival of the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power station, the residents from the two 
hosting towns were earning the highest salaries 
in the whole prefecture, even surpassing salaries 
68 Author’s translation from the Japanese title: Fukushima 
ron, genshiryoku mura ha naze umaretanoka?
69 From the interviews with the municipalities of Futaba 
and Naraha. In addition to offering direct employment, 
TEPCO also generated a great deal of indirect employ-
ment in these towns, such as restaurants for the plant 
workers and hotels for the technicians who came peri-
odically to maintain the nuclear reactors.
in Fukushima City, the prefecture’s capital city 
(Kainuma, 2011: pp.130-141). One evacuee from 
Futaba town recalls:
Thanks to the nuclear power station, our men 
did not have to look for a job away from the 
town. Everybody’s life improved and we became 
the richest in all Fukushima Prefecture. As a re-
sult, no industry developed in the town except 
agriculture. When the station was installed dur-
ing the 1970s, I was earning 52,000 yen (€520) 
per month at the agricultural cooperative. If 
you worked with TEPCO during that period, you 
earned 120,000 yen (€1,200), more than double 
your salary!
But as the nuclear facility ages, it brings dimin-
ishing financial revenues to the town70 (IIC, 2012: 
pp.329-330). Accustomed to a certain level of fis-
cal expenditure, these towns then begin to show 
budget deficits as the income from the nuclear fa-
cility declines. For this reason, the municipalities 
often ask the government to install more nuclear 
facilities in their town in order to offset the short-
fall. The report from the Independent Investiga-
tion Commission71 calls it the ‘nuclear addiction’ 
of the host communities (IIC, 2012: p.330). During 
one interview, a municipal employee of Futaba 
town murmured:
TEPCO was good for us. Most of us benefited 
from them in one way or another. I want to de-
nounce them on account of the accident, but I 
also feel grateful to them for having given us a 
prosperous life. It’s complicated. You know, be-
fore the accident, all the high school graduates 
in Futaba town found jobs in town thanks to the 
nuclear power plant. We had a privileged life.
During the interviews, many evacuees from 
these communities voiced concerns about their 
job prospects when they eventually return to their 
hometowns. Since the government announced the 
decommissioning of the four damaged reactors in 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant, they are worried 
that they will not be able to return to their former 
jobs or find any other employment, given that 
most of the local jobs were connected with the nu-
clear industry. In addition to problem of radioac-
tive contamination, the uncertainty of job oppor-
tunities further complicates the evacuees’ decision 
to return.
70 The revenue from a fixed property tax paid by the 
nuclear plant operator to the host community dimin-
ishes every year due to the depreciation of assets.
71 The independent investigation panel on the Fukushima 
accident set up by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Founda-
tion.
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Controversy on the health risks of low-dose 
radiation exposure72
On 19 April 2011, the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) 
set an interim reference radiation dose rate of 
1–20 mSv/year for schools in the Fukushima 
Prefecture, whereas the normal reference dose 
rate for public exposure to radiation73 remained 
at 1 mSv/year in other parts of Japan (ICPR, 
2007).74 Since taking this decision, the authorities 
have been using the annual dose rate of 20 mSv 
(which is the upper limit of the 1–20mSv interim 
dose rate) as the threshold value to mark out the 
evacuation zones and declare an area safe for 
return (see section 4.4. Prospects of return). To 
justify this choice, the Japanese government refers 
to the ICRP’s recommendation on the reference 
dose rate for ‘existing radiation exposure condi-
tions’ including occupational exposure situations 
and residual exposure situations after a nuclear 
accident, which should be limited to between 1 
and 20 mSv/year.75 The field interviews with the 
Fukushima evacuees, residents and local NGOs 
suggest that there are three main controversies on 
this governmental decision. 
First, the 20 mSv limit is not only applied to 
adults but also to children, who are generally con-
sidered to be more sensitive to radiation effects 
than adults.76 According to the ICRP recommen-
dation, 1–20 mSv/year is also the reference dose 
for occupational radiation exposure applied to 
workers at nuclear facilities or radiological depart-
ments in hospitals (ICRP, 2007). This means that 
nuclear power plant workers and children in Fuku-
shima are placed under the same dose limit. Fur-
thermore, MEXT established the threshold dose 
limit per hour for children to play in the school-
yard at 3.8 μSv/hour.77 However, this dose limit 
was calculated from 20 mSv/year on the assump-
tion that children spend only eight hours outside 
per day. If the average hourly rate is calculated 
72 Low-dose radiation exposure means an exposure situa-
tion under the dose of 100 mSv.
73 Here ‘radiation’ means artificial radiation excluding nat-
ural background radiation. 
74 Source: MEXT (http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hou-
dou/23/04/1305174.htm).
75 http://www.irsn.fr/EN/Research/publications-docu-
mentation/Scientific-books/Documents/CIPR_103.pdf.
76 Koide refers to the book, Radiation and Human Health, 
published in 1981 and written by the late John W. Gof-
man, who was Professor Emeritus of Molecular and Cell 
Biology at University of California, Berkley. Citing this 
book, Koide mentions that ‘an infant under one year old 
has four times more sensitivity to radiation exposure 
than an adult aged 20–30 ‘ (author’s translation).
77 Source: MEXT (http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/sai-
gaijohou/syousai/1305173.htm).
normally from the 20 mSv annual dose78, this gives 
2.28 μSv/hour. Thus, the hourly dose limit fixed by 
the government for Fukushima school children is 
1.5 μSv higher than the average hourly rate of the 
20 mSv/year threshold fixed by the same author-
ity. Compared to school children in other parts of 
Japan, where the reference dose remains 1 mSv/
year, the children in Fukushima are exposed to 
the radiation level which is as much as 30 times 
higher.79 On 1 May 2011, Tokyo University Professor 
Toshiso Kosako, a specialist on radiation safety, re-
signed his position as special advisor to the Cabinet 
in protest against this ‘3.8 μSv/hour’ and ’20 mSv/
year’ limit for children in Fukushima. He explained 
in his resignation statement80 that ‘it is completely 
wrong to use this standard for schools’ and this 
limit must ‘be used in cases of exceptional or ur-
gent circumstances (for two to three days or one to 
two weeks maximum)’, emphasising that ‘it is very 
rare even among the occupationally exposed per-
sons to be exposed to radiation of 20 mSv per year’. 
He concluded by saying that he could not possibly 
accept that this dose level be applied to babies, 
infants and primary school pupils, not only from 
his viewpoint as an academic but also on account 
of his humanistic beliefs. Despite many criticisms 
from both inside and outside Japan against this 
policy, the Japanese government has not yet re-
viewed its decision, and a radiation exposure dose 
of 20 mSv/year is still tolerated for the Fukushima 
population including children, with no fixed time-
frame (as at September 2012). 
The second controversial issue involves the au-
thorities’ dissemination of information on the 
health effects of radiation exposure. Since the 
decision on a new reference radiation dose, the 
authorities have started information campaigns 
designed to reassure the public rather than to alert 
them and raise their awareness of the radiation 
risk. MEXT has issued a number of information 
booklets on radiation intended for the general pub-
lic and schools, in which it repeatedly emphasises 
that ‘a causal relationship between radiation expo-
sure and developing cancer is not clearly proven 
under the accumulative exposure dose of 100 mSv’ 
(see Box 3) and that ‘under the exposure dose of 
100 mSv, the probability of developing a cancer 
is higher from other causes such as smoking or 
78 20,000 μSv (20 mSv) / 24 hours / 365 days = 2.28 μSv/
hour.
79 The regular dose limit is around 0.11μSv/hour calculat-
ing on the basis of 1m Sv/year.
80 Cf. Professor Kosako’s statement of resignation at a press 
conference held in Tokyo on 29 April 2011 (http://www.
japanfocus.org/events/view/83). (in-text quotations 
translated by Izumi Tanaka and the author).
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insufficient consumption of vegetables’81 (MEXT, 
2011a: pp.10-12). In addition, a booklet issued on 
24 June 2011 clearly states that ‘there is almost no 
possibility of developing thyroid cancer due to the 
recent Fukushima accident’. It concludes by saying 
that ‘the psychological stress caused by the anxiety 
of “being irradiated” has more harmful effects to 
health than radiation exposure itself and that this 
stress causes many health troubles’.82 These book-
lets do refer to the hypothesis underpinning the 
ICRP recommendation for radiation protection: 
the probability of developing a cancer is propor-
tional to the dosage exposed, even under 100 mSv 
(ICRP, 2007). However, this message is only very 
briefly mentioned, usually in one sentence, and 
the focus is more on reassuring the public that 
there is little cancer risk for exposure to radiation 
doses of under 100 mSv.
81 Author’s translation.
82 Author’s translations.
One week after the disaster, the Fukushima 
Prefecture invited Professor Shunichi Yamashita 
from Nagasaki University, appointing him as Ra-
diation Risk Management Advisor for Fukushima 
Prefecture. He has given talks on radiation risk 
in all major cities in Fukushima, reiterating that 
there is absolutely no health risk from radiation 
exposure under 100 mSv per year and that chil-
dren can play outside without any problem.83 
However, several months later he corrected this 
information stating that ‘it was rather 10 mSv/
year, not 100 mSv/year, under which there is no 
health effect’.84 A similar message was dissemi-
nated by other prefectural authorities such as the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government and public re-
search institutions such as the National Institute 
of Radiological Sciences.85 
Thirdly, this reference dose concerns only ex-
ternal exposure to radiation and does not include 
the effects of internal exposure (Box 3). In its 2007 
recommendation, ICRP urges that, in the case of 
emergency exposure situations, an individual’s 
total exposure dose from different sources be 
taken into account when developing radiation 
protection measures (ICRP, 2007). People living 
in Fukushima most likely consume local produce 
that could be contaminated by radioactive sub-
stances. The government policy, which focuses 
only on the air radiation dose and external expo-
sure, thus tends to overlook other exposure risks 
and fails to fully address the radiation protection 
needs of the concerned population.
According to the field interviews, this situation 
occasioned a great deal of confusion and distress 
among the residents and evacuees of Fukushima 
Prefecture, as they no longer knew whom or what 
to trust concerning the risk related to radiation 
exposure. Furthermore, such circumstance cre-
ated divisions and tensions among the affected 
population depending on the individual opinion 
and perception of the radiation risk, as explored 
below.
83 Author’s translations. Lecture on Radiation Risk organ-
ised by Fukushima City Council on 21 March 2011, available 
in Japanese at: http://wwwcms.pref.fukushima.jp/pcp_
portal/PortalServlet?DISPLAY_ID=DIRECT&NEXT_
DISPLAY_ID=U000004&CONTENTS_ID=23695
84 Ibid. 
85 The official statement concerning the ‘safe-
under-100 mSv’ level is quoted in many Twitter messages 
and on Internet blog sites (For example, http://blog.
livedoor.jp/wisteriabook/archives/3289454.html), but 
today it is untraceable on the websites of those institu-
tions consulted at the time of the writing (September 
2012). The author assumes that the pages were simply 
erased or made inaccessible by the institutions after they 
received criticisms from members of the public. 
Box 3. ICRP guidelines (ICRP 2007)
The health effects from radiation: ‘deterministic effects’ and 
‘stochastic effects’
Deterministic effects occur once a threshold dose of exposure is exceeded, 
generally following high radiation exposure events. These effects include 
skin redness, cataracts, infertility and, in the worst cases, death. Stochastic 
effects such as cancer or heritable effects are caused by relatively low radia-
tion doses. For exposure to a radiation dose of more than 100 mSv, there is a 
clear causal relationship established between the exposure dose and cancer 
rate. But for exposure under 100 mSv, this causal relationship has not yet 
been scientifically proven conclusively. Notwithstanding, the ICRP recom-
mendation is based on a hypothesis that there is also a proportional relation-
ship between exposure doses and cancer rates even under 100 mSv exposure.
The reference level* for three different exposure situations 
(ICRP, 2007: p.102; Holm, 2007):
Between 
20–100 mSv
Emergency 
exposure 
situations
Radiological emergency situations which 
require urgent action in order to avoid 
undesirable consequences.
Between 
1–20 mSv
Existing exposure 
situations
Occupational exposures in planned situations; 
natural background radiation (radon in 
dwellings); post-accident recovery situations
Under 1 mSv
Planned exposure 
situations
Public exposures in planned situations
* An acute dose or an annual accumulative dose.
Two types of radiation exposure: ‘internal exposure’ and ‘external exposure’
External exposure is irradiation from external radioactive sources such as 
airborne radioactive materials. Internal exposure is irradiation from radioac-
tive sources inside the body such as ingested contaminated food and water. 
After the intake of radioactive materials into the body, the person is con-
tinuously exposed to radiation until the radioactive source has completely 
decayed, a process that can take many years. The above reference dose does 
not include such internal exposure.
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The plight of Fukushima residents – 
the phenomenon of ‘self-evacuees’
In order to fully understand the grave social 
consequences of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
we must look at the situation in the Naka-dori 
region of Fukushima. Fukushima Prefecture 
comprises three regions (Maps 2 and 6): Hama-
dori on the coast, most of whose territory was 
designated as evacuation zones, Naka-dori in 
the middle, the political and economic centre 
of the Prefecture, and Aizu located inland to the 
west. In the Hama-dori region, many residents 
were forced to evacuate on the government’s 
orders, whereas the residents in the Naka-dori 
region were reassured by the authorities that it 
were safe to stay despite the elevated radiation 
dose, which in some places was as high as that 
of the official evacuation zones. For example, the 
Onami and Watari districts of Fukushima City 
have spots where radiation doses of 3.87 μSv/
hour and 10.36 μSv/hour were detected by the 
residents and an NGO (Yamauchi, 2011).86 On 16 
June 2011, the government began to designate 
the areas identified as having a radiation dose 
of more than 20 mSv/year (or 3.0 μSv/hour)87 
as Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation 
(Specific Spots), and decided to provide finan-
cial assistance for the evacuation of the resi-
dents involved. However, these districts were not 
finally designated as Specific Spots as the autho-
rities’ own readings showed a radiation dose 
under the threshold level. Moreover, in May 2011, 
MEXT disclosed information on the level of soil 
contamination in Fukushima Prefecture, which 
indicated that the amount of cesium-137 detected 
in the soil of Fukushima City and other cities in 
the Naka-dori region was more than 550 kBq/
m2 (kilobecquerels per square metre) (Kawata, 
2011). This level equals the threshold contami-
nation level for the Strict Radiation Control Area 
where residents were temporarily resettled after 
the Chernobyl accident, fixed by the radioprotec-
tion regime of the former Soviet authorities at 
the time.88 
86  The newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun, ‘Higashinihon 
daishinsai: fukushima daiichi genpatsujiko onami dis-
trict, menteki josen ha isshin ittai jisshi ichinen senryou 
saijousou no basyo mo’ (author’s translation: One year 
from whole-area decontamination operation - radiation 
dose increased in some places), 17 October 2012.
87 The threshold hourly radiation dose required for an area 
to be designated as a Specific Spot changes depending 
on the municipality, as does the method of calculating 
the hourly dose from the 20 mSv/year threshold value. 
The 3.0 μSv/hour is the threshold dose adapted by Date 
City, Fukushima (http://www.City.date.fukushima.jp/
profile/k-kaiken/pdf/h23/20111125-shiryo01.pdf).
88 Kawata, 2011.
In this context, the residents in the Nada-dori 
region, fearing the radiation effects, started to 
evacuate from their homes to other parts of Ja-
pan without any government assistance.89 Many of 
these self-evacuees were mothers with small chil-
dren90 who had either financial means or family 
connections outside Fukushima. Moreover, those 
with Internet knowledge and thus able to obtain 
information other than the official announcement 
made by the government and Fukushima Prefec-
ture were among the first to flee. Meanwhile, oth-
ers, due to financial or family reasons were obliged 
to remain in Fukushima, living with high levels 
of anxiety about the radiation risk. To cope with 
these fears, many of them are trying to convince 
themselves that they can trust the authorities’ as-
surance that it is safe for them and their children 
to live in Fukushima as long as the radiation dose 
does not exceed 20 mSv/year.91 As a result, these 
‘stayers’ started to criticise self-evacuees as well 
as other residents who remain sceptical of the of-
ficial reassurances, labelling them as cowardly and 
selfish. As one self-evacuee from Koriyama City 
explained: 
The words, ‘radiation’ and ‘evacuation’, have 
become a taboo in Naka-dori region. Voluntary 
evacuation is considered as an escape from the 
hardship that the community is trying to over-
come collectively and thus labelled as an act of 
betrayal… Mothers who oblige their children to 
wear masks all the time or to refuse the lunch 
served at school cafeteria [as schools in Fuku-
shima purchase local produce to cook lunch] in 
order to protect their children from internal ex-
posure, are often considered by other mothers as 
paranoid and annoying. In this situation, many 
mothers have become depressive and developed 
other psychological conditions, as their level of 
anxiety and the pressures from society are be-
coming too high.
This is a tragic situation for both self-evacuees 
and the residents who stay on. Self-evacuees often 
89 In December 2011, the government decided to provide 
compensation for self-evacuees from the selected 23 
cities located mainly in the Naka-dori region of Fuku-
shima. However, the scheme targeted only those who 
self-evacuated between 11 March and 31 December 2011, 
and was a one-off payment of 80,000 yen (€800) for an 
adult and 400,000 yen (€4,000) for a child or a preg-
nant woman. 
90 In culturally traditional regions such as Fukushima Pre-
fecture, it is mainly the mothers who take care of the 
children and generally stay at home as housewives. It is 
thus easier for them to flee with the children while their 
husbands stay on and continue to work in Fukushima in 
order to financially support such evacuation.
91 From the interviews with the residents and self-evacu-
ees from the Naka-dori region of Fukushima.
STUDY 05/20134 0 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Map 6. Radiation contour map of the affected region
Source: map created by Professor Yukio Hayakawa*, 11 September 2011.
Professor Yukio Hayakawa is a geologist at Gunma University (http://kipuka.blog70.fc2.com).
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feel isolated and abandoned in their place of ref-
uge, as their relationship with their hometown has 
been cut off; they have lost friends and sometimes 
their husbands if these opposed voluntary evacu-
ation and decided to stay in Fukushima. The re-
search team also learnt that self-evacuees often 
evacuated during the night without telling any-
body in order to avoid uncomfortable encounters 
with neighbours and friends. Once they evacuate, 
it is difficult for them to return as they are stigma-
tised by the community. For those who stay, the 
situation is no easier. In particular, mothers who 
are worried about the radiation effects on their 
children but do not have a choice of voluntary 
evacuation are experiencing significant psycho-
logical distress. The resident survey conducted 
in May 2012 by Fukushima City found that 34% 
of the residents still wished to evacuate from the 
City, with 89% of these respondents saying that 
they were worried about the future health of their 
children.92 Over a long run, this situation will have 
devastating consequences for the welfare of the 
population in the Naka-dori region. Yet, neither 
Fukushima Prefecture nor the government has 
set up any concrete programme to assist the self-
evacuees and the ‘stayers’, thus leaving a deeply 
divided and broken community. 
Divided communities and families 
The nuclear accident is creating many rifts and 
tensions in Fukushima’s affected communi-
ties. One of the main causes of these divisions 
stems from the government’s decision to raise 
the radiation dose reference level for Fukushima 
from 1 mSv/year to 1–20 mSv/year, as well as 
its emphasis that radiation exposures of up to 
20 mSv/year, and in some cases up to an accumu-
lative dose of 100 mSv, have little effect on health. 
This policy of reassurance, rather than precaution, 
has created an atmosphere where those who chal-
lenge the official notion of safety are viewed as 
anti-establishment, disturbing the harmony of the 
community, and egoistic, jeopardising the commu-
nity’s joint effort to overcome hardship. 
The main divisive issue for the evacuees is that 
of return. Those who openly express unwillingness 
to return are often regarded as selfish and disloyal 
to the community to which they belong. This has 
thus become a taboo subject among the evacu-
ees, as revealing one’s preference implies that the 
person concerned is likely to be pigeonholed into 
one of two boxes: ‘willing to return’ (loyal) or ‘not 
92 The newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, ‘Ima demo hinan shitai, 
fukushima shimin no 34%: shi tyousa’ (Author’s transla-
tion: 34% of residents in Fukushima City currently wish 
to evacuate, the City’s survey found), 17 September 2012.
willing to return’ (disloyal). Fukushima university 
professor Akira Imai, author of the three afore-
mentioned evacuee surveys, asserts that forcing 
the evacuees to choose between ‘return’ and ‘no re-
turn’ should be avoided (as a policy) because this 
transforms a situation of ‘not being able to return’ 
into one of ‘not wanting to return’ thus leaving 
those who are anxious about the radiation risk and 
reluctant to return to condemnation exposed to 
judgement from the rest of the community (Imai, 
2012b). Thus, whereas previously individuals had 
had no choice but to evacuate and this common 
plight had given them a sense of unity, the choice 
of return is now dividing communities, stigmatis-
ing those reluctant to return and causing further 
trauma to the evacuee communities. 
Moreover, tension has also arisen between evac-
uee communities and host communities within 
Fukushima Prefecture. Iwaki City, situated 30–40 
km south of the crippled nuclear station, for ex-
ample, hosts the highest number of evacuees 
(23,00093) from the evacuation zone due to its 
geographical proximity. The interviews with the 
evacuees and Iwaki residents revealed friction be-
tween the evacuee community and the city’s resi-
dents. This is mainly caused by the government’s 
different treatment for the affected population. 
During the first six months following the accident, 
the northern part of Iwaki City was included in 
the recommended evacuation zone and thus many 
residents, including those who were living outside 
of the designated zone, evacuated with or without 
government assistance. In addition, the city’s agri-
culture and tourism industries have been hard hit 
by radioactive contamination from the accident. 
Life has become difficult for the residents but, 
despite this hardship, they do not receive much 
financial compensation or assistance from the gov-
ernment because the city has not been included 
in any evacuation zone since October 2011 and 
they perceive this situation as unfair. On the other 
hand, the evacuees from the evacuation zone who 
took refuge in the city receive various types of 
compensation from the government. As an Iwaki 
resident explains:
These evacuees who receive a lot of money 
from the government act like the ‘new rich’ buy-
ing all the goods in a shop and always eating at 
restaurants. They don’t work and spend all day 
in a gambling house wasting the compensation 
money. Plus, there are many car accidents in the 
city because they are villagers and do not know 
how to drive in a city.
93 Source: Iwaki City council. (http://www.city.iwaki.
fukushima.jp/info/dbps_data/_material_/info/zhi-
gai20120912.pdf)
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This situation is further isolating the evacuee 
community from the host community and adding 
more stress to their displacement.
Furthermore, residents from the Naka-dori re-
gion in the Fukushima Prefecture are divided on 
the issue of evacuation. The interviews with self-
evacuees and the Naka-dori residents found that 
those who self-evacuated are seen as ‘the privi-
leged’ or ‘the escapees’ within the community 
and they thus often feel isolated and abandoned. 
On the contrary, those who stay, mostly for eco-
nomic reasons,94 are frequently envious of those 
who evacuate and often feel deprived and mar-
ginalised. Moreover, this division or tension does 
not stop at the community level: it also penetrates 
family relationships. Differing perceptions of ra-
diation risk are causing tensions within families 
or couples both among self-evacuees and stayers. 
The recent survey conducted by the Fukushima 
City found that 62% of self-evacuees are living 
apart from other family members and 71% of them 
answered that they had no prospect of going back 
to live together.95 The field interviews also found 
that the majority of self-evacuees are mothers with 
children, whose husbands have stayed behind in 
Fukushima. The main reason for this separation is 
the husband’s employment. In order to meet the 
costs of voluntary evacuation, husbands often 
stay behind in Fukushima to continue working. 
A few self-evacuees also pointed to a difference 
of opinion between husband and wife as a reason 
for separation. In their view, in the traditional 
communities of Fukushima, the husband and his 
parents tend to give credence to the authorities’ 
reassurances on the radiation risk, whereas the 
wife tends to worry about the radiation effect on 
their children. These wives are sometimes treat-
ed as cowardly and naive by their husbands and 
parents-in-law. Frustrated by their husbands’ in-
action, some mothers decide to evacuate on their 
own, taking the children to their maternal grand-
parents’ house if this is located outside Fukushima 
Prefecture. Equally, among the stayer families, the 
wife becomes disillusioned with her husband due 
to different opinions on radiation risk and fissures 
appear in their relationship. Communities and 
families in Fukushima are thus suffering from rifts 
and weakening community ties that will take long 
time to heal.
94 The survey conducted among the self-evacuees and resi-
dents in the Fukushima Prefecture by two NGOs, Friends 
of Earth Japan and Fukuro-no-kai, in September-Octo-
ber 2011 revealed that residents stayed in Fukushima 
mainly for economic or job-related reasons.
95 Asahi Shimbun, 17 September 2012, op.cit.
5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF THE TSUNAMI EVACUATION 
AND THE NUCLEAR EVACUATION
From the field interviews, we found that the 
pattern and consequences of the two evacuations, 
one caused by the tsunami and the other by the 
nuclear accident, were markedly different. In 
particular, the evacuation process, the authori-
ties’ disaster response, the prospect of return and 
the challenges facing the evacuees one year after 
the disaster are significantly dissimilar, though 
both displacements were induced by the same 
combined disaster. This section attempts to iden-
tify the specific features of the two evacuations 
through a comparative analysis. Table 5 illustrates 
the main elements of these differences. 
Firstly, as regards the reasons for evacuating, 
evacuation from a natural disaster is ultimately 
‘voluntary’ while nuclear evacuation can be com-
pulsory or ‘voluntary’ depending on one’s loca-
tion – in other words, depending on whether an 
individual evacuates from within or from outside 
the official evacuation zone. Certainly, evacu-
ation from a tsunami is not strictly voluntary in-
sofar as a person flees because his or her life is at 
risk. By the same token, the self-evacuees from 
Fukushima decided to evacuate because they felt 
their lives and those of their children were under 
threat. Nevertheless, the distinction between vol-
untary and compulsory evacuation impacts the na-
ture of post-disaster financial assistance that the 
displaced receive from the state: financial aid on 
compassionate grounds for the tsunami evacuees, 
financial compensation for the nuclear evacuees 
from the evacuation zones and little assistance for 
the self-evacuees. 
One of the specific characteristics of the nuclear 
evacuation is that the displaced have tended to 
flee further and are now dispersed throughout the 
country, while tsunami evacuees are most often 
displaced within the town or the same prefecture. 
The main reason for this is that as nuclear evacu-
ation is induced by the risk of radiation, distance 
is an important way for evacuees to protect them-
selves and feel safe. For example, half of the inter-
viewed population of Futaba town is currently dis-
placed outside Fukushima Prefecture.96 Another 
distinct characteristic of the nuclear evacuation 
is that evacuees were displaced many times com-
pared to the tsunami evacuation. Our field inter-
views show that nuclear evacuees changed their 
place of refuge four or five times on average before 
settling into temporary shelters. In contrast, tsu-
96 Source: Futaba town (http://www.town.futaba.fukush-
ima.jp/hinan.html/). (in Japanese)
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nami evacuees changed their place of refuge two 
or three times on average. Many of the tsunami 
evacuees first evacuated to hilltops to avoid the 
tsunami, then moved quickly to emergency evacu-
ation centres such as schools and finally settled in 
temporary shelters three to six months later. The 
NAIIC report (NAIIC, 2012) also confirmed the re-
sult of our study and found that 70% of the nuclear 
evacuees were displaced at least four times. One 
of the main causes of this phenomenon is that the 
evacuation zone was expanded over time by the 
authorities, thus obliging the already displaced 
population to flee further away each time. Over a 
three-month period starting on 11 March 2011, the 
authorities (Fukushima Prefecture and the gov-
ernment) issued a total of eight evacuation orders 
and recommendations. Another reason for this 
repeated displacement is that, at the time the nu-
clear evacuees fled, they were not informed of the 
severity of the accident or the radiation risk level. 
As a result, they initially sheltered in locations 
close to their hometown and later evacuated fur-
ther afield once they learnt more about the status 
of the accident and the radiation leak. This repeat-
ed flight inflicted both psychological and physical 
distress on the nuclear evacuees. 
As for psychological stress, both categories 
of evacuees are currently deeply anxious about 
their uncertain future, but the trauma of the nu-
clear evacuees appears to be persisting over the 
longer term. The tsunami evacuees experienced 
acute psychological stress immediately after the 
disaster, having suffered the sudden loss of fam-
ily members, friends, and homes. However, the 
trauma caused by this loss could subside with 
time. Nuclear evacuees, on the other hand, are 
suffering from a psychological stress that seems to 
be increasing with time. The authorities provide 
them with scant information about their future 
and whether they will eventually be able to return 
to their towns or homes, which means that they 
are unable to take the next step in rebuilding their 
lives. They feel blocked in permanent uncertainty 
and this psychological imprisonment is taking a 
toll on their health and well-being over time.
There is also a difference between the two evac-
uations with respect to the target of the evacu-
ees’ complaints. In the case of natural disasters, 
it is hard to lay the blame for psychological pain 
on a specific party. To vent their frustration, the 
tsunami survivors thus tend to criticise their lo-
cal municipal office for its shortcomings as it was 
the main actor in the disaster management. On 
the contrary, the Fukushima nuclear disaster was 
caused by human error as well as by a natural dis-
aster and the nuclear victims have well-defined 
interlocutors for their complaints – TEPCO, the 
operator of the nuclear power plant, and the gov-
ernment. The handling of the Fukushima accident 
by TEPCO and the authorities is severely criticised 
not only by the evacuees but also by the public at 
large. In Imai’s survey (Imai, 2011a), 86% of the 
evacuees said that they were not satisfied with the 
government’s disaster response and 83% were dis-
satisfied with TEPCO.
The current challenges facing evacuees are also 
quite dissimilar. For the tsunami evacuees, the 
prime concerns are resettlement and the rebuild-
ing of their houses and lives. Nuclear evacuees, 
however, are still a long way from the reconstruc-
tion phase as they are not even sure where they 
will live in the near future. Their concerns are fo-
cused on the issue of return, decontamination and 
compensation from the government. They are un-
able to make plans for the future and suffer from 
the loss of their previous life and identity. 
Finally, the issue of resettlement/return reveals 
another marked difference between the tsunami 
evacuation and the nuclear evacuation. First of 
all, the resettlement of the tsunami evacuees is or-
ganised on a purely voluntary basis and individual 
choice is fully respected by both the authorities 
and the community. Resettling in a safe place is 
Table 5. Comparative analysis of the two evacuations
Tsunami
(Natural Disaster)
Nuclear Accident
(Industrial/Man-Made 
Disaster)
Nature of 
Evacuation
‘Voluntary’ Imposed/’Voluntary’
Place of Refuge Within the City or within 
the Prefecture
Outside of the City and 
often the Prefecture, 
scattered all over Japan
Frequency of 
Displacement
2–3 times 4–5 times or more
Psychological 
Stress
Acute stress 
immediately after and 
progressively less with 
time
Stress of not knowing its 
own future lingers over 
a long term, increment 
with time
Main Target of 
Complaints
Municipal government Central government, 
TEPCO
Challenges Resettlement of the 
population, population 
loss, building back 
better
Issue of return, 
decontamination, 
community survival, loss 
of identity
Reconstruction Concentrate on 
infrastructure
Not yet reached this 
stage
 Resettlement/
Return
Safety of the population 
is main concern, 
individual choices
Highly politicised, 
collective choices
Transparency of 
Information
High Low
Decision-Making 
on Return
Democratic Top-Down
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the primary concern for the evacuees and the local 
authority. Should they decide to settle elsewhere, 
this does not put their loyalty to the community 
or their courage in overcoming hardship into ques-
tion. The only obstacles faced for the resettlement 
of these evacuees are of a financial and adminis-
trative nature. For the nuclear evacuees, on the 
other hand, the question of return involves com-
pletely different stakes. First, the issue is highly 
politicised: the authorities including the govern-
ment, the prefectural government and several af-
fected municipalities have been encouraging these 
evacuees to return. The municipalities, in par-
ticular, have emphasised that the choice to return 
must be made on a collective basis as the town’s 
very existence is at stake. Priority is thus placed 
on the cohesiveness of the community rather than 
on individual choices. One of government officials 
interviewed during our research repeated that ‘we 
will not abandon Fukushima’. The authorities’ em-
phasis on the region’s recovery and their determi-
nation to ‘normalise’ the Fukushima disaster situ-
ation have had many serious consequences for the 
residents and the evacuees. 
This official stance on the question of return 
has also impacted the transparency of the infor-
mation communicated on the level of radioactive 
contamination, the effect of radiation on human 
health and the effectiveness of decontamination 
operations, all of which are key issues condition-
ing the nuclear evacuees’ decision whether or not 
to return. While the majority of these evacuees 
are hesitant about going back due to the lack of 
information, the decision to return has often been 
made by the municipal offices without any thor-
ough discussion or consultation with the evacu-
ees. Thus, when it comes to resettlement/return, 
a democratic decision-making process is wanting 
in the case of nuclear evacuees in a contrast to the 
case of the tsunami evacuees.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The triple disaster that hit Tohoku on 11 March 
2011 is the most serious crisis that Japan has had to 
face since the end of the Second World War. Some 
refer to the disaster as the second largest defeat 
that Japan has experienced after its 1945 defeat. In 
many ways, the disaster has served as a revelation 
as well as a reality check for the democratic, pros-
perous, safe society that the country has aspired to 
build over the last sixty-six years. 
Our field study confirmed the assumption that 
Japan had intensively prepared itself against 
tsunami disasters. The disaster drills conducted 
prior to the disaster and countermeasures such 
as tsunami barriers constructed along the coast 
indeed saved many lives. Yet, in some instances, 
these preparations in fact created an excessive de-
gree of reassurance among the local population, 
who came to believe that they were immune to 
the risk of tsunamis and thus underestimated the 
threat during the actual disaster. In other cases, 
previous tsunami experiences had instilled a fixed 
idea about tsunami risk in people’s minds, which 
led them to misjudge both the need to evacuate 
and the timing. In other words, the risk percep-
tion shaped by disaster preparations and previous 
experience did not always lessen the population’s 
vulnerability in the wake of extreme disasters such 
as the 2011 Japanese tsunami. In addition, one of 
the most serious shortcomings revealed by the 
catastrophe was the lack of preparedness regard-
ing the evacuation of the elderly and persons with 
reduced mobility. Given that Japan is facing the 
growing demographic challenge of an aging popu-
lation, future disaster plans need to urgently ad-
dress this issue. 
The Fukushima nuclear accident, on the other 
hand, has revealed the total unpreparedness of the 
Japanese authorities and the local population. The 
evacuation of the population by the local authori-
ties amounted to chaotic improvisation and the 
population was forced to evacuate with no infor-
mation as to the gravity of the situation or the risk 
of radiation. Furthermore, the authorities did not 
promptly or fully communicate information on ra-
dioactive contamination and health risks from ra-
diation exposure to the concerned population. The 
choice of return tends to be a foregone conclusion 
decided on more or less unilaterally by the author-
ities without much consultation with evacuees 
and municipalities, and the collective choice for 
return is encouraged at the expense of individual 
choices and safety concerns. The displaced popu-
lation thus remains at a loss with little prospect for 
the future. Moreover, the way in which the disas-
ter has been handled by the authorities has creat-
ed profound divisions and tensions in the affected 
communities. The nuclear disaster has triggered 
a major social disaster in which communities re-
main divided regarding both the perceived radia-
tion risk and the issue of return. The population 
has lost trust in public authorities as well as among 
themselves, which is threatening the social cohe-
sion and the sense of solidarity that previously ex-
isted within these communities.
What we have also seen in the case of the nu-
clear accident, in contrast to the tsunami case, is 
that the likelihood of an accident was purposely 
understated by the government and the plant op-
erator, creating the myth that their nuclear power 
plants were almost failsafe. In the quasi absence 
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of a realistic perception of risk, the municipalities 
and population in the vicinity of the nuclear power 
plants were extremely vulnerable and insufficient-
ly prepared for a severe accident and evacuation. 
The disaster demonstrated, especially concern-
ing the exploitation of SPEEDI data, that Japan’s 
advanced technology and financial capabilities 
served little purpose when it came to improving 
disaster preparedness and response, as there was 
a lack of political will to use them effectively. 
Japan is one of the world’s largest economies, 
best known for its highly advanced technologies. 
The experience of the 11 March triple disaster has 
shown that even a country with such economic and 
technological resources could not fully mitigate 
the effects of the disaster or avoid a serious nuclear 
accident. It suggests that no country is immune to 
the risk of extreme disasters and that the basic as-
sumptions and disaster scenarios used to design 
disaster prevention measures should be thoroughly 
revisited, particularly in the current context of cli-
mate change. Moreover, the post-disaster manage-
ment of the Japanese authorities, particularly re-
garding the  Fukushima nuclear accident, revealed 
many shortcomings in terms of transparency of 
information and democratic decision-makings vis-
à-vis the affected population. This confirms our hy-
pothesis that democracies do not always respond 
better to disasters, especially a nuclear one. The 
repercussions of the Japanese disaster thus go well 
beyond the national borders and other democra-
cies can learn many relevant lessons. ❚
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Questionnaire for 
evacuees (tsunami and nuclear)
QUESTIONNAIRE (Evacuee)
1. Basic Information
Date & Time of the Interview:
Gender & Age Group of the Interviewee:
Place of Interview:
Type of Shelter:
1.1 Where were you living prior to the disaster?
1.2 Was your house situated within a special zone, 
such as the tsunami inundation zone?
1.3 When did you start living in your current 
shelter?
2. Evacuation Process 
2.1 Where were you when the earthquake 
occurred?
2.2 On the basis of what information, did you de-
cide to flee? 
2.3 When did you actually evacuate from your 
home/office?
2.4 Please tell us about your evacuation itinerary. 
Where did you flee to first and how many times 
did you change shelter? 
2.5 Did you know about the evacuation order issued 
by the central government/local government?
2.6 What was your first thought when you heard 
the evacuation order?
2.7 What do you think about the disaster response 
of the municipal government?
2.8 What do you think about the disaster response 
of the central government?
2.9 What do you think about the evacuation order 
issued by the authorities?
3. Perception of Risk
3.1 Prior to the disaster, what was your perception 
of the risk of earthquake and tsunami?
3.2 What about now (after the disaster)? 
3.3 Were you aware of the tsunami risk after the 
earthquake hit?
3.4 Prior to the disaster, what was your perception 
of risk with respect to the nuclear power plant?
3.5 What about now?
3.6 What was the source of information on which 
you based your perception of risk prior to the 
disaster?
3.7 Were there any disaster drills organised prior 
to the disaster? By whom? Have you ever taken 
part in such drills?
4. Prospect of Return and Current 
Challenges
4.1 How would you describe your current situation?
4.2 Do you have family members who live apart 
following the disaster?
4.3 Do you wish to return to where you were living 
before? 
4.4 What are the conditions for your return?
4.5 Have you returned to your home even 
temporarily?
4.6 What was your (family’s) occupation prior to 
the disaster?
4.7 Are you currently back at your previous job?
4.8 If not, do you have any prospect of returning to 
your previous job? 
4.9 If not, do you have any prospect of finding a 
new job?
4.10 What kind of assistance do you receive from 
your municipal government?
4.11 What kind of assistance do you receive from 
the central government/TEPCO?
4.12 Do you have opportunities to communicate 
with other evacuees from the same community or 
other communities? Is there any subject you tend 
to avoid when speaking with them?
4.13 Do you have opportunities to communicate 
with inhabitants of the hosting community? Is 
there any subject that you tend to avoid when you 
speak with them?
4.14 Have your children become used to the life 
and the school in the place of your temporary 
resettlement?
4.15 What were the most difficult issues when you 
decided to evacuate?
4.16 What things have you appreciated most since 
you evacuated?
4.17 What do you think about the volunteers and 
their activities?
4.18 What do you think about the media coverage 
of the disaster?
4.19 What are the most pressing issues for you?
4.20 What lessons have been learned from the 
disaster?
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for 
self-evacuees (only nuclear)
QUESTIONNAIRE (Self-Evacuee)
1  Basic Information
Date & Time of the Interview:
Gender & Age Group of the Interviewee:
Place of Refuge/Resettlement:
Type of Shelter:
1.1 Where were you living prior to the disaster?
1.2 When did you start living in your current 
shelter?
2. Evacuation Process
2.1 Where were you when the earthquake 
occurred?
2.2 How did you decide to evacuate? Please tell me 
about your decision-making process. 
2.3 From the moment that you decided to evacu-
ate, how long did it take for you to actually do so? 
2.4 How did you decide on the place of refuge/re-
settlement? What was the main reason?
2.5 Was the cost of evacuation financed by others? 
Or paid for entirely by yourself?
2.6 What was the reaction of your relatives, 
friends and neighbours regarding your decision to 
evacuate?
2.7 What was the reaction of your children?
2.8 What were the most difficult issues when you 
decided to evacuate?
2.9 What were the things that helped you the most 
with respect to the evacuation?
2.10 What information would have been useful 
when you had decided to evacuate?
2.11 Did you receive any assistance from the local 
government of your town/city with respect to your 
evacuation? 
2.12 Did you receive any assistance from the host-
ing local government of your resettlement/refuge?
2.13 What do you think about the evacuation zone 
declared by the government? 
3  Perception of Risk
3.1 Prior to the disaster, what was your perception 
of the risk of earthquake and tsunami?
3.2 What about now (after the disaster)?
3.3 Prior to the disaster, what was your perception 
of risk with respect to the nuclear power plant?
3.4 What about now?
3.5 What was the source of information on which 
you based your perception of risk prior to the 
disaster?
4  Current Challenges and Impacts
4.1 How would you describe your current situation?
4.2 Do you currently have a job?
4.3 What was your (family’s) occupation prior to 
the disaster?
4.4 Do you have family members who live apart 
following the disaster?
4.5 Do you wish to return where you were living 
before? 
4.6 What are the conditions for your return?
4.7 Have you returned to your home even 
temporarily?
4.8 What do you think about the disaster response 
taken by the municipality and the prefectural 
government? 
4.9 What do you think about the disaster response 
taken by the central government and TEPCO? 
4.10 Do you have opportunities to communicate 
with other self-evacuees or the evacuees from the 
evacuation zone? Is there any subject you tend to 
avoid when speaking with them?
4.11 Do you still have a contact with friends and 
neighbours in your city/town? 
4.12 Do you have opportunities to communicate 
with the inhabitants of the hosting community? 
Is there any subject that you tend to avoid in the 
conversation?
4.13 Did you experience any culture shock in the 
city of resettlement compared with your city/town 
of origin? 
4.14 Have your children become used to the life 
and the school in the place of your temporary 
resettlement?
4.15 What things have you appreciated most since 
you evacuated?
4.16 What were the most difficult moments since 
you took refuge?
4.17 Have any civil organisations/NGOs assisted 
you?
4.18 What are the most pressing issues at the 
moment?
4.19 What do you think about the media coverage 
of the disaster?
4.20 What lessons have been learned from the 
disaster?
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire 
for municipalities
QUESTIONNAIRE (Municipality)
1. Basic Information
Name of City/Town:
Date & Time of the Interview:
Title of the Interviewee:
Cause of Evacuation:
Population Before the Disaster
Population After the Disaster
 Of which, number of evacuees inside 
the city
 Of which, number of evacuees outside 
the city
Total Number of Evacuees 
Number of Prefabricated Housing Units
2. Disaster Prevention and Management
2.1 Please tell us about the disaster preparation 
and contingency planning established prior to the 
disaster.
Earthquake
Tsunami
Nuclear Accident
2.2 How did (or did not) this preparation function 
during the actual disaster?
2.3 What were the most important obstacles/caus-
es of the malfunctioning? 
3. Evacuation Process
Evacuation Order
3.1 When and how was the evacuation order 
issued?
3.2 How was it disseminated among the 
population?
3.3 Are there any lessons learned regarding the 
evacuation order?
3.4 Are there any lessons learned regarding the 
dissemination of evacuation orders?
3.5 As for the emergency evacuation points, how 
were they designated prior to the disaster?
3.6 Are there any lessons learned regarding the 
emergency evacuation points?
Evacuation Route
3.7 As for the evacuation route, how was it desig-
nated prior to the disaster?
3.8 Are there any lessons learned regarding the 
evacuation route?
Evacuation Centre
3.9 As for evacuation centres, were there any 
changes from the contingency plan? 
3.10 Please tell us about the development of evacu-
ation centres (from schools to prefabs).
3.11 Who managed the evacuation centres?
3.12 What was the most challenging task in manag-
ing these centres?
3.13 Did you make any special arrangement for the 
elderly at these centres?
3.14 How was the distribution of food and non-
food items and the hygiene/waste management 
organised?
3.15 How often was the monitoring/assessment of 
the living conditions of centres carried out?
3.16 How often was the monitoring/assessment of 
physical and psychological health of the evacuees 
carried out?
3.17 Are there any lessons learned from the man-
agement of evacuation centres?
Evacuation of Vulnerable Groups
3.18 How was the evacuation organised for the 
vulnerable groups such as the elderly and persons 
with disabilities?
3.19 Are there any lessons learned from the evacu-
ation of vulnerable groups?
Response to Offers of Assistance
3.20 How did your municipality respond to various 
offers of assistance from all over Japan and 
abroad? Was there any coordination mechanism 
established within the municipality?
3.21 What was the most valuable assistance, in 
terms of materials and services, and what was the 
most troublesome offer?
Designation of Uninhabitable Zones (for tsunami-
affected municipalities)
3.22 Were uninabitable zones designated after the 
disaster?
3.23 What is the compensation scheme for those 
whose houses are included in the zone?
3.24 Are there any other zones that prohibit house 
construction? 
In General
3.25 What are the lessons learned regarding the 
evacuation from this disaster?
3.26 What are the most pressing issues regarding 
the evacuees at the moment? 
4. Relationship with Central Government, Pre-
fectural Government and TEPCO (if applicable)
4.1 As for the evacuation order, when and what 
kind of information did you receive from Central 
Government/Prefectural Government/TEPCO?
4.2 Amidst the confusion, were there any conflict-
ing orders/information regarding the evacuation?
4.3 From this experience, what would you ask 
them to improve for the future disasters? 
4.4 As for the designation of evacuation zones, 
what would you ask them to improve? 
4.5 What financial/personnel/material assistance 
is provided by Central Government/Prefectural 
Government/TEPCO?
4.6 How is this assistance used for the municipality?
4.7 Regarding assistance, what would you ask 
them to improve?
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4.8 Are there any lessons learned in dealing with 
Central Government/Prefectural Government/
TEPCO?
5. Perception of Risk
5.1 Prior to the disaster, what was your perception 
of the risk of earthquake and tsunami?
5.2 What about now? (after the disaster)
5.3 Were the previous tsunami experiences incor-
porated in the disaster preparation and evacu-
ation exercise? Were these experiences widely 
shared among the population? 
5.4 Prior to the disaster, what was your percep-
tion of the risk with respect to the nuclear power 
plant?
5.5 What about now? (after the disaster)
6. Current Challenges and Impacts of the 
Disaster
6.1 What are the prospects for the return of the 
evacuees/population? 
6.2 What do you think the conditions for the re-
turn of evacuees will be?
6.3 What kind of incentives/strategies do you 
have to encourage their return?
6.4 How many companies and shops have stopped 
their activity/business after the disaster?
6.5 What do you think the conditions for these 
companies to restart their activity/business will 
be?
6.6 hat are the prospects for the return and re-
starting of businesses?
6.7 What kind of incentives/strategies do you 
have to encourage them to return and resume 
their activities?
6.8 Concerning evacuation centres, it seems that 
some functioned very well in terms of relations 
among the evacuees, and some did not. Did you 
observe the similar situation in your town? 
6.9 What do you think was the cause/reason?
6.10 Were there any problems in disseminating in-
formation to the former communes that had pre-
viously been incorporated into the City?
6.11 What do you think about the media coverage 
of the disaster?
6.12 How do you think the municipality responded 
to the offer of assistance (materials and services) 
from all over Japan and abroad?
6.13 What did you appreciate most in disaster 
response? 
6.14 What was the most surprising thing that you 
encountered in the disaster response?
6.15 What are the lessons learned from this 
disaster?
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Appendix 4: List of meetings and seminars attended during the field research
Date Meeting Organiser (Place) Place Speaker Title/Organisation
27 May The 4th Talk- Talk 
Fukushima
Association for 
Fukushima Evacuee 
Mothers & Children in 
Kanto
Tokyo Self-Evacuee from Ootama 
village (Fukushima)
Evacuated to Kanagawa 
Prefecture
Member of Kaachan’s (NGO in 
Sagamihara City)
2 Jun Symposium ‘To protect 
children from radiation’
Association to consider 
child rearing since 3.11
Tokyo Mr Nobuyuki ABE Member of CRMS/Fukushima 
Kodomo (NGOs in Fukushima 
City) 
Self-Evacuee from 
Koriyama City (Fukushima)
Evacuated to Yokohama City
Mr Ryuhei KAWATA Member of the House of 
Councillors
6 Jun Closed consultation 
meeting
Hiroyuki Yoshino, Member 
of Kodomo Fukushima 
(NGO in Fukushima City) 
Kyoto Evacuees from 
Iwaki City (3)
Minamisoma City(2)
Fukushima City (1)
Naraha town (1) 
Residents of Yamashina 
public-sector apartments 
(used by evacuees from 
Fukushima) 
Mr Shinichiro ISHIHARA Elected member of the 
Fukushima prefectural 
assembly from Koriyama City
7 Jun Closed consultation 
meeting
Hiroyuki Yoshino, Member 
of Kodomo Fukushima 
(NGO in Fukushima City) 
Kyoto Evacuees from Fukushima 
City (5)
Koriyama City (2)
Iwaki City (2)
Namie town (1)
Kawamata City (1)
Minamisoma City (1), 
Unknown (1)
Member of Fucco Salon 
Nagomi, created by NGO 
Hibiscus
Mr Shinichiro ISHIHARA Elected member of the 
Fukushima prefectural 
assembly from Koriyama City 
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Source: Citizens’ Nuclear Information Centre (http://www.cnic.jp/english/cnic/index.html).
Appendix 5: Map of nuclear power plants in Japan
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